



## MTVA DETAILED ANALYSIS

2026-04-10\_kerdesek-oraja

Programme: MTVA-Sendung (M1/Kossuth Rádió) | 2026-04-10 | Analysed: 2026-05-24 21:49

Version 3.0-detail | Universal 3.0-detail | Konverter 3.4 (2026-05-20) | Mércé: Mttv. §83

### TOTAL SCORE

**7.7/10**

*Serious deviation from the balance requirement. High degree of deviation*

0 = balanced, 10 = strongly biased/manipulative

## POLITICAL SPECTRUM

Classification based on the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) 2024

The Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) classifies parties on a left-right scale based on a survey of 609 political scientists (0 = far left, 10 = far right). We apply the Pew Research Center (2025) thresholds: <4.5 = Left, 4.5–5.5 = Centre, >5.5 = Right. This enables objective classification of perceived party-political bias.

Party	DK	MSZP	Momentum	LMP	KDNP	Fidesz	Mi Hazánk
CHES	1.69	2.31	3.15	3.46	6.92	7.77	9.31
Spectrum	Left	Left	Left	Left	Right	Right	Right

The overall tendency appears on a 0–10 scale (0 = strongly left-leaning, 5 = balanced, 10 = strongly right-leaning). The calculation is based on the difference between the average advantage of left-wing and right-wing parties (grouped according to CHES 2024).

### TENDENCY (L – R)

**6.0 / 10**

**Balanced**

0 1 2 3 4 5 **6** 7 8 9 10

← Left

Right →

Source: Chapel Hill Expert Survey 2024 — [chesdata.eu](https://chesdata.eu) | [Jolly et al., Electoral Studies, 2022](#) | Thresholds: [Pew Research Center](#)

This section provides political context and is not included in the total score.



## POLITICAL LANDSCAPE

**Government:** Fidesz-KDNP has governed continuously since 2010, currently holding a two-thirds parliamentary majority (135 seats out of 199). The leading force of the party alliance is Fidesz, with KDNP as its coalition partner. Prime Minister: Orbán Viktor.

**Opposition:** The strongest opposition force since 2024 is TISZA (the Tisztelet és Szabadság party led by Magyar Péter), which received 29.6% in the 2024 EP elections. Also represented in parliament are DK, Momentum, Jobbik, LMP, and MSZP (who ran as the United Opposition in 2022), as well as Mi Hazánk (6 seats). MKKP is an extra-parliamentary force.

Party	CHES left-right	Seats (2022)	Government/Opposition	Basic position
MSZP	3,00	(Unit. Opp.)	Opposition	Left, social-democratic
MKKP	3,50	0	Extra-parliamentary	Left, satirical-libertarian
LMP	3,79	(Unit. Opp.)	Opposition	Left, green-progressive
Momentum	4,17	(Unit. Opp.)	Opposition	Centre-left, pro-EU
DK	4,28	(Unit. Opp.)	Opposition	Centre-left
TISZA	6,17	— (new 2024)	Opposition (strongest)	Centre-right, anti-corruption
Jobbik	6,47	(Unit. Opp.)	Opposition	Centre-right (moderated)
Fidesz-KDNP	8,61	135	Government (2/3)	Far right, authoritarian-nationalist
Mi Hazánk	9,29	6	Opposition	Far right

The country's most important political fault line runs between Fidesz-KDNP and the newly strengthened TISZA, where the stakes of the 2026 elections are the continuation or replacement of 16 years of Orbán governance. The second line of tension concerns the relationship to the war in Ukraine: the government argues for maintaining Russian energy dependence under a "peace" narrative, while the opposition takes a pro-Western, Ukraine-solidarity stance. The third fault line is the question of EU sovereignty: Fidesz pursues a sovereigntist, anti-Brussels policy, while the opposition advocates constructive EU membership. The fourth dimension is the state of democratic institutions: TISZA and other opposition parties demand the restoration of the rule of law, the dismantling of the media monopoly, and the independence of the judiciary.

MTVA (M1, M2, M4, M5, Duna TV) operates as a public service media provider that de facto functions as a governmental propaganda tool: the NMHH Media Council has been staffed exclusively by persons close to Fidesz since 2010, and the KESMA foundation (2018) consolidated approximately 500 media companies in a pro-government direction. Independent media outlets (Telex.hu, 444.hu, RTL Klub, ATV) operate in an increasingly constrained space; Hungary ranks 85th on the Reporters Without Borders press freedom index, the worst ranking in the EU. Mttv. §83 prescribes objective, balanced and diverse information in public service media, but its enforcement is structurally not upheld.



## CHAPTER 1 — PARTY-POLITICAL BIAS

Party	Score (-5..+5)	Portrayal in the programme vs. party platform position
Fidesz-KDNP	+2	01:01–01:44: The government's peace narrative, utility cost reduction, economic achievements framed positively — Party platform: peace, utility cost reduction, sovereignty — partially correct, but without critical context, one-sidedly favourable
TISZA	-4	01:19–01:28: "aggressiveness", "culture of hatred" — 04:04–05:49: "not democrats", "crying fraud" — Party platform: anti-corruption, rule of law, pro-EU — strongly distorted, platform positions do not appear, exclusively negative characterisation
DK	-3	04:18–04:19: "I include DK here too [among non-democrats]" — 46:06–46:23: "pro-Ukrainian" party — Party platform: strong pro-EU, social safety net — distorted, platform positions are not presented
Momentum	0	Not featured in the programme.
Jobbik	0	Not featured in the programme.
Mi Hazánk	-1	14:36–20:22: The mobilisation of Mi Hazánk voters appears implicitly, but the party's platform and far-right positions are not mentioned — unbalanced omission
LMP	0	Not featured in the programme.
MSZP	0	Not featured in the programme.

### Score explanation:

- +5 = The party platform positions are portrayed correctly and completely
- 0 = The party/topic does not appear in the programme
- -5 = The party platform positions are actively distorted or misrepresented

### Party bias summary

- Most accurate portrayal: Fidesz-KDNP (+2) — the government narrative at least partially corresponds to the party platform positions, though without critical context.
- Strongest distortion: TISZA (-4) — the party's platform positions (anti-corruption, rule of law, pro-EU) do not appear at all; exclusively negative, demonising characterisation is presented.
- Average deviation from 0: 1.4
- Conclusion: The programme conveys the Fidesz-KDNP platform positions — if not entirely accurately — at least partially, while in the case of TISZA and DK, only negative characterisation according to the government narrative appears. The TISZA's anti-corruption, rule-of-law and pro-EU platform elements are never mentioned; the party appears exclusively as an "aggressive", "hatred-inciting", "undemocratic" entity. This is not a presentation of a party platform, but a discrediting of a political opponent.

### Left-right overall tendency

TENDENCY SCORE: -3.8


CLASSIFICATION: Strongly right-leaning

Justification: The programme's sole guest is a minister of the governing Fidesz-KDNP, who conveys exclusively government narrative for 50 minutes. Opposition parties — especially TISZA — appear exclusively in a negative



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context, and their platform positions are not presented. The topic frames (peace vs. war, stability vs. chaos, democrats vs. non-democrats) mirror the Fidesz-KDNP campaign messages without counterbalance.



## CHAPTER 2 — PROGRAMME DATA AND TOPIC FRAMES

### Programme data

- Title: Kérdések Órája
- Date: 11 April 2025 (Friday, approximately 40 hours before the elections — explicit in the programme: "we are recording this programme at half past one on Friday", "two days before the elections")
- Estimated length: ~51 minutes (based on transcript)
- Host/Reporter: Csuha Ildikó
- Invited persons:

Person	Function	Party/Affiliation	Political spectrum
Gulyás Gergely	Minister heading the Prime Minister's Office	Fidesz-KDNP	Far right (CHES 8.61)

### Main topic

On the eve of the 2025 Hungarian parliamentary elections, Minister Gulyás Gergely conveys campaign messages about Fidesz-KDNP's chances of victory, the democratic reliability of the opposition, the danger of electoral fraud, the government narrative regarding the Panyi Szabolcs affair, Russian energy dependence, and the Trump–Orbán relationship.



## CHAPTER 3 — 15 CRITERIA: DETAILED ANALYSIS

### Hard facts — countable and scientifically grounded

### Hard facts — 9 measurable and scientifically verifiable techniques

#### 1. EXPERT SELECTION

9/10

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Total score: 9/10

Definition: Who speaks as an expert?

#### 1st expert: Gulyás Gergely — Minister heading the Prime Minister's Office, Fidesz-KDNP

Timestamp: 00:21

Statement: "My guest is Gulyás Gergely, Minister heading the Prime Minister's Office."

Classification: Active member of government, leading politician of Fidesz-KDNP, directly interested party in the election campaign.

Missing counter-opinion: A representative of any opposition party, an independent political scientist, an electoral expert.

Source deep analysis:

**(a) FUNDING:** State-funded position (minister); Fidesz-KDNP party funding derives partly from state sources, partly from private sources. Direct interest: the outcome of the election determines his political position.

**(b) MANDATE:** The ministerial mandate is entirely incompatible with neutral expert assessment; Gulyás Gergely is an active campaign participant, not an independent analyst.

D1 Conflict of interest: -2 — Directly interested party: the outcome of the election determines his position

D2 Personal risk: -2 — Risks nothing with his statements; his position depends on victory

D3 Professional competence: +1 — Legal background, governmental experience; but the topics discussed (electoral system, intelligence services, energy) are not all within his area of expertise

D4 Opinion consistency: +1 — Represents a consistent government narrative

D5 Emotional vs. data-based: -1 — Numerous emotional-political claims without data (e.g. "culture of hatred", "non-democrats")

D6 Source level: -1 — Primarily own assertions, not primary documents

**TOTAL: -4 → SOURCE TRAFFIC LIGHT: YELLOW (borderline, with strong conflict of interest)**

**(c) PROFESSIONAL COMPETENCE:** The host addresses him as "guest" and "Minister", without indicating that he is an active campaign participant conveying campaign messages 40 hours before the elections.

Missing expert groups:

- Independent political scientist (e.g. Institute of Political Science)
- Independent electoral law expert
- Representative of an opposition party



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*Summary (matrix result):*

- Gulyás Gergely: YELLOW (-4) — Active interested party, not a neutral expert; as the programme's sole guest, exclusively government narrative appears.

**Source credibility overview:**

Source	D1	D2	D3	D4	D5	D6	Total	Signal
expert: Gulyás Gergely — Minister heading the Prime Minister's Office, Fidesz-KDNP	-2	-2	+1	+1	-1	-1	-4	<b>YELLOW</b>



2. SOURCE SELECTION								8/10	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

Claims without primary source = penalty points (rumour check)

Total score: 8/10

Definition: What sources are cited? Are they varied and independent?

### 1st source: Nézőpont Intézet

Timestamp: 16:43–16:53

Statement: "the Nézőpont Intézet indicated 66 individual mandates for you"

**(a) Funding and operator:** Nézőpont Intézet is a pro-government research institute; its funding derives partly from state commissions, partly from Fidesz-aligned sources. It is not an independent polling institute.

**(b) Structural conflict of interest:** It has a direct interest in publishing results favourable to Fidesz-KDNP in order to maintain the client relationship.

**(c) Missing counter-source:** Data from Medián, Závecz Research or other independent institutes — which showed significantly different results — are not placed in a positive context.

### 2nd source: Alapjogok Központja

Timestamp: 16:56–16:58

Statement: "the Alapjogok Központja somewhat fewer, they put it at 60"

**(a) Funding:** State-funded institute with Fidesz-aligned leadership.

**(b) Structural conflict of interest:** Identical to the above; not an independent analytical institute.

**(c) Missing counter-source:** Medián (which measured a TISZA lead instead of a 23% Fidesz advantage) — the host mentions it, but Gulyás dismisses it as "cabaret", and this assessment goes unchallenged.

Rumour check (penalty points):

#### 1st rumour:

Timestamp: 40:27–40:45

Claim: "he says that he is on friendly terms with Orbán Anita, the TISZA party's candidate for foreign minister, and that if the TISZA party came to power, he could dictate who should be fired from the foreign ministry"

Signal word: "he says" — indirect claim, no primary source named

Primary source present: No — +1 penalty point

#### 2nd rumour:

Timestamp: 44:43–44:50

Claim: "if you claim that the Ukrainians are, say, financing TISZA's campaign"

Signal word: "say" — conditional, unsubstantiated claim

Primary source present: No — +1 penalty point

Summary: The programme cites exclusively pro-government sources (Nézőpont, Alapjogok Központja) in a positive context; the guest dismisses data from independent pollsters, and the host does not challenge this. Two unsubstantiated claims are also made.



<b>3. TIME ALLOCATION</b>							<b>7/10</b>		
<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>7</b>	8	9	10

Total score: 7/10

Definition: Distribution of speaking time between different positions.

Estimated speaking time:

- Gulyás Gergely (government narrative): approx. 38 minutes (75%)
- Csuha Ildikó (host): approx. 13 minutes (25%)
- Opposition voice: 0 minutes (0%)
- Independent expert: 0 minutes (0%)

Summary: The entire programme broadcasts from a single source, the active minister of the governing party; no opposition or independent voice is given any airtime at all. The 75% guest speaking time is not in itself problematic, but the complete source monopoly — especially 40 hours before the elections — represents a serious imbalance problem.



#### 4. SELECTIVE OMISSION

9/10

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Total score: 9/10

Definition: What is not presented, even though it would be relevant?

##### 1st omission:

Context: The TISZA's platform positions (anti-corruption, rule of law, EU constructiveness, healthcare, education) are entirely absent.

Relevant: 01:19–05:49 (where TISZA appears exclusively as the subject of negative characterisations)

Effect: The viewer receives no information about what TISZA stands for; only the government's image of the opponent is presented.

##### 2nd omission:

Context: The intelligence abuse dimension of the Gundalf-Misch-Budha affair — the allegation that the Fidesz government attempted to undermine TISZA using intelligence service tools.

Relevant: 42:19–43:55

Effect: The government narrative is accepted without criticism; substantive examination of the allegation is absent.

##### 3rd omission:

Context: The role of MTVA and KESMA media concentration in the campaign — the structural media dominance of Fidesz-KDNP.

Relevant: The context of the entire programme

Effect: One of the most important factors in the asymmetry of the electoral contest remains invisible.

Summary: The programme systematically omits all information that would question or nuance the government narrative; the consistent direction of the omissions reinforces a picture favourable to Fidesz-KDNP.

##### Missing voices

- Independent electoral expert: Would have contributed to assessing the disproportionality of the electoral system, both sides of the infringement proceedings, and the independence of the electoral commissions.
- TISZA representative or Magyar Péter: Would have contributed to presenting the party's platform positions, responses to Gulyás's accusations, and its democratic commitment.
- Independent expert in media law: Would have contributed to assessing the press freedom dimension of the Panyi Szabolcs affair and the legal framework for source protection.
- Energy economist: Would have contributed to analysing the real economic and geopolitical risks of Russian energy dependence and the sustainability of utility cost reduction.
- EU rule-of-law expert: Would have contributed to assessing the freezing of EU funds, the Article 7 procedure, and the EU legal dimension of the Szijjártó–Lavrov affair.
- Independent pollster: Would have contributed to comparing the methodologies of different institutes and examining the validity of the rejection of Medián data.
- Intelligence law expert: Would have contributed to an independent legal assessment of the Gundalf-Misch-Budha affair and the Panyi affair.
- Ukrainian or EU diplomatic analyst: Would have contributed to contextualising the Zelenskij accusations, the closure of the friendship oil pipeline, and Hungarian–Ukrainian relations.



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5. NUMBER MANIPULATION						6/10			
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

Complete numbers include: absolute value, ratio (%) and trend

Total score: 6/10

Definition: Selective or misleading use of statistics.

### 1st finding:

Timestamp: 05:01–05:11

Number: "The electoral commission has so far established electoral violations by the TISZA party in approx. 200 cases"

Dimensions: (a) absolute number given ✓ — (b) ratio missing X — (c) trend missing X

Missing context: How many infringement proceedings were initiated in total? In how many cases were violations established against other parties? How serious are these cases? The "approx. 200" figure is misleading without context.

Effect: Portrays TISZA as a law-breaking party, while the basis for comparison is absent.

### 2nd finding:

Timestamp: 36:38–36:42

Number: "you have to pay 800–900 thousand forints a year on utilities, not 250 thousand forints"

Dimensions: (a) absolute number given ✓ — (b) ratio missing X — (c) trend missing X

Missing context: What level of consumption does this refer to? What methodology was used to calculate it? Comparison with other EU countries? The real cost of utility cost reduction (state subsidy, debt)?

Effect: Suggests a dramatic difference whose methodological basis cannot be verified.

### 3rd finding:

Timestamp: 23:57–24:14

Number: "trade between the United States and Hungary... last year this already broke all previous records"

Dimensions: (a) absolute number not given X — (b) ratio missing X — (c) trend partial ✓

Missing context: Without concrete figures the claim is unverifiable; the magnitude of growth, the GDP ratio, and comparison with other EU member states are absent.

Effect: Presents the economic benefit of the Trump–Orbán relationship as proven without concrete data.

Summary: The numbers cited in the programme consistently reinforce the government narrative, while the basis for comparison, ratios, and methodological context are regularly absent.



6. GUILT BY ASSOCIATION								8/10	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

Total score: 8/10

Definition: Discrediting through association with negative groups/ideas.

### 1st association:

Timestamp: 40:09–41:19

Quote: "in the leadership of the TISZA party there are people who have direct ties to agents of foreign states"

Technique: Characterisation of Panyi Szabolcs as an "agent of a foreign state" → Orbán Anita's (TISZA foreign minister candidate) friendly relationship with Panyi → TISZA = under the influence of foreign intelligence services.

Effect: Portrays TISZA as a tool of foreign (Ukrainian/Western) intelligence services, without proof.

Association chain: Panyi Szabolcs (journalist) → "agent of a foreign state" → Orbán Anita (TISZA) → TISZA government = foreign intelligence influence

Source verification in the case of Panyi Szabolcs:

- Does he work with primary sources? YES — the audio recording published by Bloomberg is a primary source
- Are his claims falsifiable? YES — the content of the audio recording is verifiable
- Risk-taking: Espionage complaint, career risk — Risk > Gain
- Tone: Professional-investigative, not apocalyptic
- RESULT CATEGORY: A — Systemic-critical journalist with methodology

IMPORTANT: The programme frames Panyi as an "agent" — this is itself framing, not fact. The categorisation was made on the basis of the above criteria, not on the basis of the programme's framing.

### 2nd association:

Timestamp: 44:34–47:04

Quote: "it is completely obvious that the Ukrainian interest is for there to be a pro-Ukrainian, Ukraine-friendly government in Hungary"

Technique: TISZA + DK = "pro-Ukrainian" → Zelenszkij wants a change of government → TISZA = representative of Ukrainian interests in Hungary

Effect: Portrays opposition parties as servants of foreign (Ukrainian) interests, without proof.

Summary: The programme constructs two parallel association chains: TISZA = foreign intelligence influence, and TISZA = representative of Ukrainian interests. Both associations are unproven; in the case of Panyi Szabolcs, the "agent" qualification is the programme's framing, not a proven fact.



<b>7. TIMING</b>								<b>8/10</b>	
<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>8</b>	9	10

Total score: 8/10

Definition: Strategic placement of information (beginning/middle/end).

### 1st finding:

Position: 00:36–00:55 (beginning)

Content: Recalling the mysterious Gulyás statement from 2024 ("What is happening now has nothing to do with me, but if it did, if it turns out it did, then they will be grateful to me") — followed by the interpretation: the emergence of TISZA benefited Fidesz.

Timing effect: In the first minute of the programme, TISZA is framed as a "gift" from Fidesz; this interpretive frame defines the entire programme.

### 2nd finding:

Position: 03:17–03:46 (beginning)

Content: Presentation of Orbán Viktor's "dramatic statement" about the danger of electoral chaos — 40 hours before the elections.

Timing effect: The electoral fear narrative is placed at the beginning of the programme, defining the frame of the entire discourse.

### 3rd finding:

Position: 49:08–50:41 (end)

Content: "A guarantee of cheap utility prices... a guarantee of standing on the side of peace... we have experience with the left... they ruined the country and drove it into bankruptcy."

Timing effect: The closing minutes of the programme end with pure campaign messages, which are fixed as the last impression in viewers' minds — 40 hours before the elections.

Summary: The structure of the programme consciously follows campaign logic: fear narrative at the beginning, campaign messages at the end; the middle section serves to discredit the opposition.



## 8. SELECTIVE OUTRAGE

7/10

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Outrage = bias. Selective outrage reinforces the finding. Score = degree of outrage (0–5) + selectivity (0–5)

Total score: 7/10

*Definition: Outrage at certain positions, but not at similar ones.*

*Methodological principle (v2.2): Before each assessment, the triggering event must be documented. A reaction can only be classified as selective if a similar triggering event did not produce an analogous reaction at other positions.*

### 1st finding:

Timestamp: 04:04–05:49

Triggering event: Gulyás claims that TISZA is "not democratic" because it does not accept the election result in advance.

Reaction: "Why not? This is a very serious claim." — The host asks back once, but does not challenge the claim after Gulyás's detailed elaboration.

Comparison: 08:01–08:25 — Gulyás claims that Fidesz "always respected the results of elections" — the host does not challenge this, even though Fidesz's behaviour after the 2002 and 2006 elections (protests, "I do not recognise" statements) would be relevant context.

Asymmetry: The "non-democratic" accusation levelled at TISZA receives one follow-up question but remains without substantive examination; Fidesz's democratic self-image is accepted without criticism.

### 2nd finding:

Timestamp: 38:09–39:17

Triggering event: Gulyás characterises Panyi Szabolcs as an "agent of a foreign state".

Reaction: "He did not say he was an agent, he wrote that he was an investigative journalist" — a single follow-up question, then acceptance.

Comparison: 42:19–43:55 — Regarding the Gundalf-Misch-Budha affair, Gulyás presents the government narrative; the host does not ask about the substantive content of the intelligence abuse allegation.

Asymmetry: Accusations concerning the opposition receive one follow-up question but remain without substantive examination; accusations levelled against the government remain without substantive examination.

Degree of outrage: 2/5

Selectivity: 5/5

Summary: The host shows moderate outrage towards certain Gulyás claims (asks back once), but this consistently appears in relation to accusations concerning the opposition, while accusations levelled against the government remain without substantive examination.



## 9. SELECTIVE OMISSION — OVERALL PICTURE

9/10

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Total score: 9/10

Definition: How complete is the programme's coverage of the topic?

### 1st finding:

Timestamp: 05:01–05:11

Missing perspective/fact: The complete picture of electoral infringement proceedings — how many proceedings were initiated in total, how many involved other parties, how serious are the cases against TISZA.

Relevance: The claim of "approx. 200 violations" is misleading without context; proceedings are initiated against every party during an election campaign.

Effect: TISZA appears as a law-breaking party, while the basis for comparison is absent.

### 2nd finding:

Timestamp: 42:19–43:55

Missing perspective/fact: The substantive content of the Gundalf-Misch-Budha affair — the allegation that the Fidesz government attempted to undermine TISZA using intelligence service tools.

Relevance: This is one of the most important campaign topics; uncritical acceptance of the government narrative gives a one-sided picture.

Effect: The allegation of intelligence abuse remains invisible; only the government explanation appears.

### 3rd finding:

Timestamp: The entire programme

Missing perspective/fact: The platform positions, electoral promises, and responses to government accusations of TISZA, DK and other opposition parties.

Relevance: The complete absence of opposition party platforms in a programme broadcast 40 hours before the elections represents a fundamental imbalance problem.

Effect: The viewer receives exclusively the government narrative; the opposition alternative is invisible.

Summary: The programme systematically omits all information that would question the government narrative; the consistent direction and extent of the omissions are not random but structural.

End of hard facts — Beginning of soft facts

### Soft facts — debatable, not merely countable

The 2025 Hungarian election decides on the continuation or interruption of Fidesz-KDNP dominance that has lasted since 2010. Since TISZA's debut at the 2024 EP elections (29.6%), it has become a genuine challenger. The campaign is defined on the government side by the "peace vs. war", "stability vs. chaos" narrative, and on the opposition side by the anti-corruption and rule-of-law restoration narrative. The Panyi Szabolcs affair (journalist accused of espionage), the Gundalf-Misch-Budha affair (allegation of intelligence abuse), the Szijjártó–Lavrov wiretapping affair, and the Trump–Orbán relationship are all active campaign topics. The disproportionality of the electoral system (dominance of individual constituencies) provides Fidesz-KDNP with a structural advantage.



*Proportion of perspectives covered*

*Inverted: the original value measures coverage (higher = better). Displayed as deviation (higher = greater gaps).*

**[A] OMITTED**

Timestamp: — — Quote: — — Assessment: The TISZA's platform positions (anti-corruption, rule of law, EU constructiveness) are never presented; the party appears exclusively as the subject of negative characterisations.

**[B] OMITTED**

Timestamp: — — Quote: — — Assessment: The structural disproportionality of the electoral system, which favours Fidesz-KDNP, is not mentioned at all.

**[C] OMITTED**

Timestamp: 38:09–39:17 — Quote: "this is not source protection or journalistic work, this is agent cooperation with the secret service of a foreign state" — Assessment: The press freedom and source protection dimension is entirely absent; only the government's espionage narrative appears.

**[D] OMITTED**

Timestamp: 42:19–43:55 — Quote: "the Hungarian services have made everything public in this matter" — Assessment: The allegation of intelligence abuse receives no substantive examination; the government narrative is accepted without criticism.

**[E] OMITTED**

Timestamp: 02:02–02:28 — Quote: "as for Medián, that is not a public opinion poll" — Assessment: Data from Medián and other independent pollsters are dismissed; only data from pro-government institutes (Nézőpont, Alapjogok Központja) are placed in a positive context.

**[F] PARTIALLY ADDRESSED**

Timestamp: 36:12–37:17 — Quote: "we can maintain utility cost reduction, we can continue to provide Hungarian taxpayers with the cheapest prices in Europe" — Assessment: Only the government narrative appears; the geopolitical risks of energy dependence and the logic of EU sanctions are not mentioned.

**[G] OMITTED**

Timestamp: 05:01–05:11 — Quote: "The electoral commission has so far established electoral violations by the TISZA party in approx. 200 cases" — Assessment: Only TISZA-side violations are mentioned; government-side campaign tools (use of state resources, MTVA campaign airtime) are not.

**[H] OMITTED**

Timestamp: 23:34–26:22 — Quote: "represents such a tangible opportunity for the country" — Assessment: The Trump–Orbán relationship appears exclusively in a positive frame; democratic values, NATO obligations, and US interference in Hungarian elections are not addressed in a critical dimension.

**[I] OMITTED**

Timestamp: — — Quote: — — Assessment: The KESMA media concentration and the disproportionality of MTVA campaign airtime allocation are not mentioned at all.

**[J] OMITTED**

Timestamp: — — Quote: — — Assessment: The freezing of EU funds and the context of rule-of-law proceedings do not appear.

### Completeness score: 1/10

**Justification:** Of the ten relevant perspectives, only one appears partially (Russian energy dependence), and even that exclusively within the government narrative frame. The TISZA's platform positions, independent polling data, the press freedom dimension, the disproportionality of the electoral system, the allegation of intelligence abuse, and the EU rule-of-law context are entirely absent. The programme makes no effort to present the topic from multiple angles; it consists of a single source and a single narrative.



## Soft facts — 6 qualitative techniques

### 10. FRAME DEFINITION

9/10

1

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Total score: 9/10

Definition: How does the programme fundamentally frame the topic?

#### 1st finding:

Timestamp: 01:19–01:28

Quote: "all that aggressiveness, all that culture of hatred that appeared in Hungarian public life together with the TISZA party"

Manipulation: The emergence of TISZA = "culture of hatred" and "aggressiveness" — this is not a description but a value judgement, which the host does not challenge.

Why problematic: For the viewer, TISZA appears as a fundamentally negative, dangerous entity before any of its platform positions or substantive content is mentioned.

#### 2nd finding:

Timestamp: 11:03–11:08

Quote: "now security is the most important thing"

Manipulation: The concept of "security" is associated exclusively with Fidesz-KDNP; the opposition is implicitly the source of insecurity.

Why problematic: The "security vs. chaos" frame mirrors the Fidesz campaign message; the host does not challenge this.

#### 3rd finding:

Timestamp: 49:08–50:41

Quote: "A guarantee of cheap utility prices and the continuation of cost reduction, a guarantee of home creation, a guarantee of family support, a guarantee that Hungary will stand on the side of peace."

Manipulation: The fourfold repetition of the word "guarantee" functions as a campaign message; the host does not challenge whether these are actually guarantees.

Why problematic: The closing minutes of the programme become pure campaign communication; the verification of the "guarantee" claims is absent.

Summary: The programme's fundamental frame is: Fidesz-KDNP = security, peace, stability, guarantee; TISZA/opposition = aggressiveness, hatred, chaos, foreign influence. This frame mirrors the Fidesz-KDNP campaign message and runs throughout the entire programme.



11. LANGUAGE AND CONCEPTS								8/10	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

Total score: 8/10

Definition: What language is used? What connotations are established?

### 1st finding:

Timestamp: 01:19–01:28

Quote: "culture of hatred"

Manipulation: A strongly negative compound word that portrays TISZA as a sect-like, destructive entity.

Why problematic: Neutral alternative: "sharp campaign communication" or "confrontational political style". The word "cult" carries religious-sectarian connotations.

### 2nd finding:

Timestamp: 38:17–38:20

Quote: "who goes by the name Panyi Szabolcs, and whose cover activity is being a journalist"

Manipulation: The word "cover activity" is spy-novel terminology; it suggests that Panyi Szabolcs's journalistic activity is merely a cover.

Why problematic: Neutral alternative: "journalist accused of espionage". The word "cover activity" treats an unproven fact as fact.

### 3rd finding:

Timestamp: 10:24–10:27

Quote: "I think that could have been a dream after a drug party."

Manipulation: Characterising Magyar Péter's dream as a "dream after a drug party" is a personal attack that implies the political opponent is a drug user.

Why problematic: Neutral alternative: "This is a political scenario I disagree with." The expression "drug party" is personal discrediting, not a political argument.

Summary: The programme's language consistently mirrors government campaign language: the opposition represents a "culture of hatred", the journalist engages in "cover activity", the political opponent dreams "dreams after a drug party". These are not neutral descriptions but political weapons.



12. MODERATOR BEHAVIOUR							7/10		
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

Total score: 7/10

Definition: Asymmetries in follow-up questions, interruptions, expressions of sympathy.

Methodological principle (v2.2): Before each assessment, the triggering event must be documented. An intervention can only be classified as asymmetric if a similar triggering event did not produce an analogous intervention with other guests.

### 1st finding:

Timestamp: 04:37–04:40

Triggering event: Gulyás claims that TISZA and DK are "not democrats".

Quote (host): "Why not? This is a very serious claim."

Comparison: 08:13–08:17 — Gulyás claims that "Fidesz always respected the results of elections" — the host does not challenge this.

Asymmetry: The accusation levelled at TISZA receives one follow-up question; Fidesz's self-image is accepted without criticism. Fidesz's behaviour after the 2002 and 2006 elections would be relevant context, but is not mentioned.

### 2nd finding:

Timestamp: 38:43–38:49

Triggering event: Gulyás characterises Panyi Szabolcs as an "agent of a foreign state".

Quote (host): "He did not say he was an agent, he wrote that he was an investigative journalist"

Comparison: 42:19–43:55 — Regarding the Gundalf-Misch-Budha affair, the host does not ask about the substantive content of the intelligence abuse allegation.

Asymmetry: Accusations concerning the opposition receive one follow-up question; accusations levelled against the government remain without substantive examination.

### 3rd finding:

Timestamp: 00:25

Triggering event: The opening of the programme.

Quote (host): "Thank you very much, Minister, for coming in the final stretch of the campaign."

Comparison: No opposition guest appears in the programme, so direct comparison is not possible; but the explicit acknowledgement of the "campaign final stretch" indicates that the host is aware of the campaign context, yet does not apply heightened critical distance.

Asymmetry: Not directly measurable, but the acknowledgement of the campaign context and the absence of critical distance are jointly problematic.

Summary: The host maintains moderate critical distance — a few follow-up questions are asked — but these consistently appear in relation to accusations concerning the opposition, while the government's self-image and accusations levelled against the government remain without substantive examination.



<b>13. QUESTION ASYMMETRY</b>							<b>7/10</b>		
<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>7</b>	8	9	10

Total score: 7/10

Definition: Questions of different hardness/softness posed to different persons.

### 1st asymmetry:

To Gulyás, 04:37: "Why not? This is a very serious claim." — [medium hardness]

Comparison: No questions are put to TISZA or Magyar Péter — they do not appear in the programme.

Comparison: 08:13 — "Fidesz always respected the results of elections" — [not challenged]

Assessment: The claim questioning TISZA's democratic reliability receives one follow-up question; Fidesz's democratic self-image does not.

### 2nd asymmetry:

To Gulyás, 20:03–20:10: "So would you support a coalition with Mi Hazánk, or not?" — [medium hardness, repeated three times]

Comparison: Mi Hazánk's far-right platform positions and the democratic consequences of a coalition are not discussed.

Assessment: The question probing the possibility of a coalition is technical in nature; assessment of Mi Hazánk's far-right character is absent.

Summary: The host asks a few medium-hardness questions, but these are consistently technical-tactical in nature (how many mandates, coalition yes/no), and do not touch on the substantive content of the government narrative or a critical examination of Fidesz-KDNP's platform positions.



<b>14. FALSE BALANCE</b>									<b>5/10</b>
<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	6	7	8	9	10

*Total score: 5/10*

*Definition: Artificial balance despite actual inequality.*

### **1st finding:**

Timestamp: 06:43–07:07

Construction: "but in Debrecen it was precisely TISZA, or Magyar Péter, who formulated the accusation that things had gone badly wrong there... that is, electoral fraud"

Analysis: The host raises a TISZA-side electoral fraud accusation (the Debrecen food parcel affair), as if this created balance against the government's electoral chaos narrative. However, the two accusations are not equivalent: one is a specific local case, the other is a general narrative questioning the credibility of the entire election. The false balance suggests that "both sides" accuse each other of electoral fraud, whereas the weight and nature of the accusations differ fundamentally.

Summary: A limited degree of false balance appears in the programme; the host raises opposition viewpoints in a few cases, but these are consistently weaker and less developed than the government narrative.



## 15. AGENDA SETTING

9/10

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Total score: 9/10

Definition: What counts as normal/self-evident? What does not make it onto the agenda?

### 1st finding:

Item placed on agenda: TISZA = "not democratic", "culture of hatred", "foreign influence" — this appears as a self-evident starting point.

Timestamp: 01:19–05:49 — Evidence: "all that aggressiveness, all that culture of hatred that appeared in Hungarian public life together with the TISZA party"

Alternative agenda: TISZA's platform positions, the party's democratic commitment, substantive examination of government accusations.

### 2nd finding:

Item placed on agenda: Fidesz-KDNP's 15 years of governance = "stability", "peace", "guarantee" — this appears as a self-evident positive.

Timestamp: 49:08–50:41 — Evidence: "A guarantee of cheap utility prices... a guarantee of standing on the side of peace"

Alternative agenda: The freezing of EU funds, rule-of-law proceedings, media concentration, corruption allegations, the state of the healthcare and education systems.

### 3rd finding:

Item placed on agenda: The Trump–Orbán relationship = an unambiguously positive fact serving the country's interests.

Timestamp: 23:34–26:22 — Evidence: "represents such a tangible opportunity for the country"

Alternative agenda: US interference in Hungarian elections (Trump recommended Orbán to Hungarian voters three times), democratic norms, NATO obligations.

Summary: The programme's agenda entirely mirrors the Fidesz-KDNP campaign agenda: government performance appears as a positive, the opposition as a danger, the Trump connection as an advantage; critical context is systematically absent.



## CHAPTER 4 — OVERALL ASSESSMENT

### Overview of individual scores

No.	Criterion	Type	Score	Main finding (1 sentence)
1	Expert selection	H	9	Single guest: active government member, active campaign participant, without an independent voice.
2	Source selection	H	8	Exclusively pro-government institutes in a positive context; independent pollsters dismissed.
3	Time allocation	H	7	75% government narrative, 0% opposition or independent voice.
4	Omission	H	9	TISZA's platform positions, the intelligence abuse allegation, and media concentration are entirely absent.
5	Number manipulation	H	6	Numbers consistently without context or basis for comparison, reinforcing the government narrative.
6	Guilt by association	H	8	TISZA = foreign intelligence influence and representative of Ukrainian interests — without proof.
7	Timing	H	8	Fear narrative at the beginning, campaign messages at the end — deliberate campaign logic.
8	Selective outrage	H	7	Moderate follow-up questioning on accusations concerning the opposition; government self-image accepted without criticism.
9	Completeness	H	9	Systematic omission: complete absence of opposition programmes, critical context, independent voices.
10	Framing	S	9	Fidesz = security/peace/guarantee; TISZA = aggressiveness/hatred/chaos — frame maintained throughout.
11	Language	S	8	"Culture of hatred", "cover activity", "drug party" — language used as a political weapon.
12	Moderator behaviour	S	7	Moderate critical distance; asymmetry in the handling of opposition accusations and the government's self-image.
13	Question asymmetry	S	7	Technical-tactical questions; critical examination of the substantive content of the government narrative is absent.
14	False balance	S	5	Limited degree of false balance; opposition viewpoints are weaker and less developed.
15	Agenda setting	S	9	The programme's agenda entirely mirrors the Fidesz-KDNP campaign agenda.

### Results

- HARD FACTS SCORE (average of criteria 1–9): 7.9 / 10
- SOFT FACTS SCORE (average of criteria 10–15): 7.5 / 10
- TOTAL SCORE (average of all 15 criteria): 7.7 / 10



## Dominant techniques

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- 1. Agenda setting (score 9):** The programme's agenda entirely mirrors the Fidesz-KDNP campaign agenda; critical context, opposition programmes, and independent voices are systematically absent. The programme broadcast 40 hours before the elections functions de facto as a campaign tool.
- 2. Framing (score 9):** The frame "Fidesz = security/peace/guarantee; TISZA = aggressiveness/hatred/chaos/foreign influence" runs throughout the entire programme and fundamentally determines the viewer's interpretive frame. This is not random word choice but a consistent narrative strategy.
- 3. Omission (score 9):** TISZA's platform positions, the substantive content of the intelligence abuse allegation, media concentration, EU rule-of-law proceedings, and independent polling data are systematically absent. The consistent direction of the omissions indicates structural bias.

## The programme's core messages

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- 1. MESSAGE (SUBSTANTIVE):** "Fidesz-KDNP is the guarantor of peace, stability and security; the opposition is aggressive, hatred-inciting, undemocratic and serves foreign interests."

Technique: Framing + agenda setting — Evidence: 01:19, 04:04, 49:08

- 2. MESSAGE (PERSONAL):** "Magyar Péter and TISZA are not a reliable political force: they are under the influence of foreign intelligence services, do not accept the rules of democratic play, and are running a hatred campaign."

Technique: Guilt by association + language — Evidence: 38:17, 40:27, 10:24

- 3. MESSAGE (SOCIAL):** "Hungary's stability and security can only be guaranteed by the continuous governance of Fidesz-KDNP; a change of government would bring chaos, war and economic collapse."

Technique: Timing + framing — Evidence: 11:03, 49:08, 50:34

## Manipulation level classification

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Justification: The programme's total score of 7.7/10 indicates systematic one-sidedness. The requirement of objective, balanced and diverse information prescribed by Mttv. §83 is violated in multiple dimensions: a single source (active government member), the complete absence of opposition platform positions, consistent negative framing, and uncritical transmission of campaign messages. The programme was broadcast 40 hours before the elections, which makes the imbalance particularly serious. The near-identical scores for hard facts (7.9) and soft facts (7.5) indicate that the one-sidedness manifests not only in subjective value judgements but also in measurable, objective indicators (time allocation, source selection, omissions).

## SUMMARY

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The 11 April 2025 edition of Kérdések Órája — broadcast approximately 40 hours before the 2025 Hungarian parliamentary elections — seriously violates the requirement of balanced and diverse information prescribed by Mttv. §83 in multiple dimensions. The programme's sole guest is an active minister of the governing Fidesz-KDNP, who conveys exclusively government campaign messages for 50 minutes; no opposition voice, independent expert, or critical context appears at all. TISZA's platform positions (anti-corruption, rule of law, pro-EU) are entirely absent; the party appears exclusively as an "aggressive", "hatred-inciting", "undemocratic" and "foreign-influenced" entity. The programme's agenda, framing, and language entirely mirror the Fidesz-KDNP campaign agenda, and in the critical pre-election period it functions de facto as a campaign tool. This constitutes a systematic violation of the requirements of objectivity, balance, and diversity of opinion under Mttv. §83.



## OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF THE 15 CRITERIA

### Individual scores — All 15 criteria

No.	Criterion	Score	Classification
1	EXPERT SELECTION	9/10	Systematic imbalance
2	SOURCE SELECTION	8/10	Pronounced imbalance
3	TIME ALLOCATION	7/10	Pronounced imbalance
4	SELECTIVE OMISSION	9/10	Systematic imbalance
5	NUMBER MANIPULATION	6/10	Significant imbalance
6	GUILT BY ASSOCIATION	8/10	Pronounced imbalance
7	TIMING	8/10	Pronounced imbalance
8	SELECTIVE OUTRAGE	7/10	Pronounced imbalance
9	SELECTIVE OMISSION — OVERALL PICTURE	9/10	Systematic imbalance
10	FRAME DEFINITION	9/10	Systematic imbalance
11	LANGUAGE AND CONCEPTS	8/10	Pronounced imbalance
12	MODERATOR BEHAVIOUR	7/10	Pronounced imbalance
13	QUESTION ASYMMETRY	7/10	Pronounced imbalance
14	FALSE BALANCE	5/10	Significant imbalance
15	AGENDA SETTING	9/10	Systematic imbalance

#### HARD FACTS SCORE (1-8)

**9.0/10**

*Fundamental systemic one-sidedness. Very high degree of bias*

#### SOFT FACTS SCORE (9-14)

**7.5/10**

*Serious deviation from the balance requirement. High degree of deviation*

#### TOTAL SCORE

**8.3/10**

*Fundamental systemic one-sidedness. Very high degree of bias*

*Average of hard facts and soft facts*



## LEGEND — Meaning of scores

### Individual scores per criterion (0–10)

<b>0</b>	<b>No finding</b>	No relevant anomaly detectable.
<b>1–2</b>	<b>Weak finding</b>	Minor anomaly without significant effect on balance.
<b>3–4</b>	<b>Mild-moderate finding</b>	Recognisable tendency; low-to-moderate impact relevance.
<b>5</b>	<b>Moderate finding with impact</b>	Relevant imbalance that influences the audience's opinion-forming potential.
<b>6</b>	<b>Significant finding (threshold)</b>	Scores of 6 or higher qualify as "significant findings".
<b>7</b>	<b>Significant finding</b>	Clear, well-documented imbalance with obvious impact relevance.
<b>8–9</b>	<b>Serious finding</b>	Pronounced imbalance; multiple individual findings documented for this criterion.
<b>10</b>	<b>Maximum severity</b>	Systematic and pervasive imbalance for this criterion.

### Aggregate deviation index — Interpretation ranges

<b>0.0 – 2.5</b>	<b>Imperceptible</b>	No significant patterns detectable; the programme meets the balance requirement.
<b>2.6 – 4.0</b>	<b>Mild imbalance</b>	Isolated anomalies; statistically visible, but still within the tolerance threshold.
<b>4.1 – 6.0</b>	<b>Significant imbalance</b>	Multiple significant findings; relevant violation of viewpoint diversity.
<b>6.1 – 8.0</b>	<b>Serious deviation from the balance requirement. High degree of deviation</b>	Pronounced, cross-programme patterns; high impact relevance.
<b>8.1 – 10</b>	<b>Fundamental systemic one-sidedness. Very high degree of bias</b>	Maximum pronouncedness in almost every criterion; systematically one-sided reporting.

### Party-political bias (from -5 to +5)

<b>-5 to -3</b>	<b>Strongly disadvantaged</b>	The party is significantly underrepresented in framing, speaking time, or presentation.
<b>-2 to -1</b>	<b>Mildly disadvantaged</b>	Recognisable but mild disadvantage.
<b>0</b>	<b>Neutral</b>	No preference or disadvantage detectable.
<b>+1 to +2</b>	<b>Mildly advantaged</b>	Recognisable but mild preference.
<b>+3 to +5</b>	<b>Strongly advantaged</b>	The party is significantly overrepresented in framing, speaking time, or presentation.



## CHAPTER 5 — LEGAL ASSESSMENT (Mttv. §83)

### Assessment under Mttv. §83

Mttv. §83 requires that the public service media provider must provide current, objective and balanced information in news and information programmes, and must reflect diversity of opinion.

#### 1st violation:

Norm: Mttv. §83 (1) — balance and diversity of opinion

Facts: The programme's sole guest is an active minister of the governing party; no opposition voice, independent expert, or critical perspective appears at all.

Evidence: Timestamp 00:21 — "My guest is Gulyás Gergely, Minister heading the Prime Minister's Office." — The entire programme (00:01–50:59) consists of a single source.

Assessment: The requirement of diversity of opinion prescribed by Mttv. §83 is entirely violated; the programme does not reflect the different positions of the political spectrum, conveying exclusively the government narrative.

#### 2nd violation:

Norm: Mttv. §83 (1) — objectivity

Facts: Unsubstantiated claims are made as facts in the programme: TISZA is "not democratic", Panyi Szabolcs engages in "cover activity", the Ukrainians are financing TISZA's campaign.

Evidence: Timestamp 04:04 — "cannot be qualified as democratic"; 38:17 — "his cover activity is being a journalist"; 44:43 — "the Ukrainians are, say, financing TISZA's campaign"

Assessment: The requirement of objectivity is violated; uncritical transmission of unsubstantiated claims does not meet the standards of public service information.

#### 3rd violation:

Norm: Mttv. §83 (1) — currency and completeness

Facts: In a programme broadcast 40 hours before the elections, the platform positions of opposition parties, independent polling data, and the substantive content of accusations levelled against the government are entirely absent.

Evidence: The entire programme — the platform positions of TISZA, DK, Momentum, LMP, MSZP, Jobbik are never mentioned; Gulyás dismisses Medián's data as "cabaret" (02:14–02:28), and the host does not challenge this.

Assessment: The requirement of completeness and currency is violated; in the critical pre-election period, it would be a particularly important task of public service media to ensure diverse information.

#### 4th violation:

Norm: Mttv. §83 (2) — the public service media provider may not engage in campaign activity

Facts: The closing minutes of the programme (49:08–50:41) contain pure campaign messages: "A guarantee of cheap utility prices... a guarantee of standing on the side of peace... we have experience with the left... they ruined the country and drove it into bankruptcy."

Evidence: Timestamp 49:08–50:41 — the above quotes

Assessment: The public service media provider's programme functions as a campaign tool 40 hours before the elections; this is a serious violation of the requirements of impartiality and balance under Mttv. §83.

### Overall assessment under Mttv. §83

The 11 April 2025 edition of Kossuth Rádió's Kérdések Órája seriously violates the requirements of balance, objectivity, and diversity of opinion prescribed by Mttv. §83 in multiple independent dimensions. The violations are not random or occasional, but permeate the entire structure and content of the programme: a single source, consistent



negative framing of the opposition, transmission of unsubstantiated claims as facts, and uncritical broadcasting of campaign messages in the critical pre-election period. The seriousness of the violations is compounded by the fact that the programme was broadcast approximately 40 hours before the 2025 parliamentary elections, when it would be a particularly important task of public service media to ensure balanced and diverse information. Due to the structural pro-Fidesz composition of the NMHH Media Council, enforcement of the violations is formally possible but cannot be expected in practice.

## SOURCE DEEP ANALYSIS (Mandatory for every cited specialist institution / NGO / advisory organisation)

### Nézőpont Intézet

- 1. FUNDING:** Pro-government private funding; its regular clients include Fidesz-KDNP and pro-government organisations. It is not an independent polling institute.
- 2. MANDATE:** The mandate is not compatible with neutral polling assessment; the client relationship creates structural bias.
- 3. CONFLICT OF INTEREST:** Direct financial interest in publishing results favourable to Fidesz-KDNP in order to maintain the client relationship.
- 4. CREDIBILITY MATRIX:**
  - D1 Conflict of interest: -2 — Direct client relationship with Fidesz-KDNP
  - D2 Personal risk: -2 — Risks nothing by publishing results favourable to Fidesz
  - D3 Professional competence: +1 — Polling methodology is present
  - D4 Opinion consistency: -1 — Consistently Fidesz-favourable results
  - D5 Emotional vs. data-based: +1 — Publishes numerical data
  - D6 Source level: 0 — Own data collection (secondary)**TOTAL: -3 → SOURCE TRAFFIC LIGHT: YELLOW (borderline, with strong conflict of interest)**
- 5. COUNTER-OPINION:** Medián, Závecz Research and other independent institutes showed significantly different results; these are not placed in a positive context in the programme.

### Alapjogok Központja

- 1. FUNDING:** State-funded institute; it receives its funding from the state budget, with Fidesz-aligned leadership.
- 2. MANDATE:** The mandate is not compatible with neutral political analysis; the institute regularly publishes analyses reinforcing the government position.
- 3. CONFLICT OF INTEREST:** Direct state funding dependency; analyses favourable to Fidesz-KDNP are a condition for maintaining funding.
- 4. CREDIBILITY MATRIX:**
  - D1 Conflict of interest: -2 — Direct state funding dependency
  - D2 Personal risk: -2 — Risks nothing by publishing analyses reinforcing the government narrative
  - D3 Professional competence: +1 — Legal and political science experts
  - D4 Opinion consistency: -1 — Consistently government-narrative-reinforcing analyses
  - D5 Emotional vs. data-based: +1 — Publishes numerical data
  - D6 Source level: 0 — Own data collection (secondary)**TOTAL: -3 → SOURCE TRAFFIC LIGHT: YELLOW (borderline, with strong conflict of interest)**
- 5. COUNTER-OPINION:** Independent political science institutes (e.g. Political Capital, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung) have published significantly different analyses; these are not mentioned in the programme.

*IMPORTANT: "Recognised" is not a professional qualification. It is a social attribution that must itself be examined. In the case of both institutes, the label "pro-government" is not a pejorative qualification but a structural fact that is relevant in assessing the conflict of interest.*

### Source credibility overview:

Source	D1	D2	D3	D4	D5	D6	Total	Signal
violation:	-2	-2	+1	-1	+1	0	-3	<b>YELLOW</b>

### Legal and methodological classification



**Schweizerischer Verein** für ausgewogene Berichterstattung  
**Association suisse** pour une information équilibrée  
**Associazione svizzera** per un reporting equilibrato

**Not a finding of fact**

The results presented do not constitute a finding of fact regarding individual persons, editorial offices, or programmes. They are the results of standardised operationalisation, not a determination of individual responsibility.

**Not a legal judgement**

The aggregate deviation index does not replace the legal assessment under Mttv. §83. Determining whether a given programme violates statutory requirements is exclusively the task of the competent authorities (in particular the Media Council).

**Not evidence of causality**


Statistical correlations must not be interpreted as evidence of causal relationships or editorial intent. Deviation values may be influenced by topic selection, the news situation, political controversy, or format logic.

**Not an assessment of intent**

The analysis measures the observable structural characteristics of programmes. A score of 7 means that significant imbalance has been established — not that the editorial team did this intentionally. The methodology makes no statements about motives.

**Heuristic comparative tool**

The index serves for comparative pattern recognition across thousands of programmes, not for precise metric measurement of individual contributions. The threshold values serve as heuristic orientation, not as precise legal qualification.



## ANNEX 1: NATIONAL LEGISLATION

### Legal basis Hungary — MTVA

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#### Laws

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- Act CLXXXV of 2010 on Media Services and Mass Communication (Mtv.)
- Act CIV of 2010 on the Freedom of the Press (Smtv.)
- The Fundamental Law of Hungary (2011)

#### Relevant articles

##### Mtv. (Media Act 2010)

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- §83 (1): Public service obligation — current, objective and balanced information in news and information programmes.
- §83 (2): Information must reflect diversity of opinion.
- §12: Protection of pluralism of opinion as a fundamental principle.
- §13: Prohibition of one-sided information in news programmes.

##### Smtv. (Press Freedom Act 2010)

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- §4: Freedom of the press and freedom of expression.
- §10: Separation of news and opinion.
- §13: Right of correction.

#### Fundamental Law

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- Article IX: Freedom of opinion and the press, media pluralism as a state obligation of protection.

#### European reference framework

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- ECHR Article 10: Right to freedom of expression (European Convention on Human Rights)
- EU Rule of Law Report: Annual assessment, documenting systematic media freedom deficiencies since 2018
- RSF Press Freedom Index: Reporters Without Borders, annual ranking
- EMFA (European Media Freedom Act, 2024): EU-level minimum standards for media freedom

#### Special case — Structural non-enforcement

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IMPORTANT: The Mtv. formally contains correct balance obligations. The criticism is not directed against the text of the law, but against the structural non-enforcement by the pro-government NMHH. MTVA is a broadcaster under de facto state-aligned control.

#### Supervisory authority

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- NMHH (Nemzeti Média- és Hírközlési Hatóság): National media and communications authority. Structurally pro-government composition since 2010.

#### Complaint procedure

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1. NMHH (formally, but structurally not independent)
2. Kúria (Supreme Court, in theory)



## ANNEX 2: ACADEMIC REFERENCES

### Literature

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### SVFAB Working Papers

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- Schläpfer, D. (2026). Systematic AI-Assisted Analysis of Public Broadcaster Impartiality: A Scalable Methodological Framework for Measuring Structural Bias in Public Service Media. [SSRN 6688478](#)
- Schläpfer, D. (2026). Measuring Editorial Noise: A Retrospective Suppression Index for Public Broadcasting Content Analysis. [SSRN 6733280](#)
- Schläpfer, D. (2026). Source Traffic Light: A Six-Dimensional Credibility Framework for Systematic Source Assessment in Public Service Media. [SSRN 6733880](#)

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