



## SABC DETAILED ANALYSIS

20240126\_ICJ ruling on SA's case against Israel.en

Broadcast: SABC-Sendung | Analyzed: 2026-05-25 10:11

Version 3.0-detail | Universal 3.0-detail | Konverter 3.4 (2026-05-20) | Standard: Broadcasting Act s. 6

### OVERALL SCORE

**4.5/10**

*Significant imbalance*

0 = balanced, 10 = strongly biased/manipulative

## POLITICAL SPECTRUM

Classification based on Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) 2024

The Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES 2024) is an academic survey of 609 political scientists in 31 countries. Each party is rated on a scale from 0 (far left) to 10 (far right).

Party	EFF	MK	ANC	IFP	DA	ActionSA	PA	FF+
CHES	1.50	3.50	4.50	6.00	6.50	6.50	7.00	8.00
Spectrum	<i>Left</i>	<i>Left</i>	<i>Center</i>	<i>Right</i>	<i>Right</i>	<i>Right</i>	<i>Right</i>	<i>Right</i>

The overall tendency is presented on a 0–10 scale (0 = strongly left-favoring, 5 = balanced, 10 = strongly right-favoring). The calculation is based on the difference in average favoritism of left vs. right parties (grouping per CHES 2024).

### TENDENCY (L – R)

**3.8 / 10**

*Left-favoring*

0 1 2 **3** 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

← Left

Right →

Source: Chapel Hill Expert Survey 2024 — [chesdata.eu](https://chesdata.eu) | [Jolly et al., Electoral Studies, 2022](#) | Thresholds: [Pew Research Center](#)

This section provides political context and does not contribute to the overall score.



## POLITICAL LANDSCAPE

### > PRELIMINARY NOTE ON TRANSCRIPT QUALITY

> The transcript provided is severely degraded — large portions consist of fragmented words, incomplete sentences, musical interludes, and inaudible segments (particularly 00:28–14:50 and portions of 21:00–24:00). The substantive content begins at approximately 14:50 with the ICJ ruling being read aloud, followed by a brief analyst commentary segment beginning at approximately 63:23. This analysis works strictly from what is audible and transcribed. Where the transcript is too fragmented to support a finding, this is noted explicitly. No inferences are drawn from inaudible segments.

South Africa is governed since June 2024 by a Government of National Unity (GNU) — a broad coalition led by the ANC (159 seats, 39.8%) after losing its 30-year parliamentary majority. Key coalition partners include the DA (87 seats, 21.8%), IFP (17 seats, 4.3%), PA (9 seats, 2.3%), and FF+ (6 seats, 1.5%), giving the GNU approximately 287 of 400 parliamentary seats. The main opposition outside the GNU consists of MK (58 seats, 14.6%, led by Jacob Zuma), EFF (39 seats, 9.5%, led by Julius Malema), ActionSA (6 seats), and ACDP (3 seats).

Party	CHES L-R	Seats	Government/Opposition	Core Position
EFF	1.5	39	Opposition	Far-left; land expropriation, nationalisation
PAC	2.0	1	GNU (minor)	Left-wing Pan-Africanist
MK	3.0	58	Opposition	Left-populist, Zuma personality cult
ANC	4.0	159	GNU (lead)	Centre-left, broad church
Al Jama-ah	4.0	2	GNU (minor)	Left economics, socially conservative
UDM	4.5	3	GNU (minor)	Centre-left, rural base
Rise Mzansi	4.5	2	GNU (minor)	Centre-left progressive
GOOD	4.5	1	GNU (minor)	Centre-left progressive
DA	6.0	87	GNU	Centre-right, free market, liberal
ActionSA	6.5	6	Opposition	Centre-right, anti-immigration
IFP	6.5	17	GNU	Right-wing, Zulu nationalist
PA	7.0	9	GNU	Right-wing populist
ACDP	7.5	3	Opposition	Right-wing Christian conservative
FF+	8.0	6	GNU	Right-wing, Afrikaner interest

South Africa's ICJ genocide case against Israel is one of the most politically unifying issues domestically — the ANC, EFF, and MK are strongly pro-Palestinian, while the DA has expressed more nuanced positions, creating intra-GNU tension. The case is simultaneously a matter of international law, domestic electoral politics, and ANC foreign policy legacy. SABC coverage of this case therefore carries significant political weight, as it touches directly on ANC foreign policy achievements and the GNU's internal coherence on international affairs.

The SABC is South Africa's public broadcaster, mandated under the Broadcasting Act 4 of 1999 and its own Charter to provide impartial, fair, and accurate news and public affairs programming in the public interest. The SABC has a documented history of political capture during the Hlaudi Motsoeneng era (approximately 2012–2016), and questions



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about residual ANC editorial influence remain a live issue in South African media discourse. As the broadcaster of record for a case in which the South African government is the applicant, the SABC faces a structural conflict between its public interest mandate and its proximity to the state party.



## CHAPTER 1 — PARTY-POLITICAL BIAS

*Assessment note: The broadcast consists primarily of a live reading of the ICJ Order — a verbatim legal document — followed by approximately 90 seconds of analyst commentary (63:23–64:21). No party representatives appear. No party positions are directly debated. The scoring below reflects the degree to which party programme positions were accurately represented where they were implicitly engaged.*

Party	Score (-5..+5)	Broadcast Representation vs. Programme Position
ANC	+1	63:23–64:21: Analyst frames ruling as potentially helpful to "Biden administration" and notes "most of the International Community" supports ceasefire — consistent with ANC's pro-Palestinian foreign policy position; no challenge offered. ANC's position as applicant state is implicitly validated throughout. Programme position (pro-Palestinian, ICJ case as moral leadership): broadly consistent, not distorted.
DA	0	Not mentioned. DA's more nuanced position on the Gaza conflict (supporting humanitarian aid while questioning the genocide framing) is entirely absent. Score 0 = not present, but absence itself is a finding (see Step 2).
MK	0	Not mentioned. MK's strongly pro-Palestinian position would align with broadcast framing but is not referenced.
EFF	0	Not mentioned. EFF's strongly pro-Palestinian position would align with broadcast framing but is not referenced.
IFP	0	Not mentioned.
PA	0	Not mentioned.
FF+	0	Not mentioned.
ActionSA	0	Not mentioned.

### Party Bias Summary

- Most Accurate Representation: ANC (Score +1) — the broadcast's framing is broadly consistent with ANC foreign policy positions without active distortion.
- Strongest Distortion: DA (Score 0 by absence) — the DA's publicly stated reservations about the genocide framing are entirely unrepresented, creating an implicit one-sided picture on a politically contested issue.
- Average Deviation from 0: 0.1 (across all 8 parties)
- Conclusion: The broadcast does not actively misrepresent any party's position, but the complete absence of any dissenting domestic political voice — particularly the DA's publicly stated position — means the broadcast implicitly validates the ANC government's framing of the case without challenge. The analyst commentary at 63:23 reinforces this by treating the ruling as a straightforward diplomatic success without acknowledging domestic political contestation.



## CHAPTER 2 — BROADCAST INFORMATION AND THEMATIC FRAMEWORK

### Broadcast Data

- Title: SABC News — Live coverage of ICJ Provisional Measures Order: South Africa v. Israel (Genocide Convention case)
- Date (from context): 26 January 2024 (date of ICJ Order delivery, confirmed by internal references to "18 January 2024" statement by Israeli PM and "17 January 2024" UNRWA statement)
- Estimated Length: Approximately 64 minutes (transcript ends at 64:21)
- Presenter/Reporter: Unidentified analyst/correspondent (voice heard from 63:23); ICJ President Joan Donoghue reads the Order (14:50–62:23)
- Persons Interviewed/Featured:

Actors	Function	Party/Affiliation	Political Spectrum
ICJ President Joan Donoghue	President, International Court of Justice	Judicial/International	Neutral (judicial)
Unidentified SABC Analyst	Correspondent/Analyst	SABC	Unidentified
Minister Naledi Pandor	Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, RSA	ANC	Centre-left
Martin Griffiths (quoted)	UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs	United Nations	International/Humanitarian
Philippe Lazzarini (quoted)	UNRWA Commissioner-General	United Nations	International/Humanitarian
UN Secretary-General António Guterres (quoted)	Secretary-General, United Nations	United Nations	International
Yoav Gallant (quoted)	Defence Minister, Israel	Likud/Israeli Government	Right-wing
Isaac Herzog (quoted)	President of Israel	Israeli Government	Centre-right
Israel Katz (quoted)	Minister of Energy and Infrastructure, Israel	Israeli Government	Right-wing

### Main Topic

The broadcast covers the live delivery of the International Court of Justice's Order on provisional measures in the case of South Africa v. Israel concerning alleged violations of the Genocide Convention in Gaza.

### World-View Context

The ICJ case was filed by South Africa on 29 December 2023, alleging that Israel's military operations in Gaza following the Hamas attack of 7 October 2023 constitute violations of the Genocide Convention. The case is unprecedented in that a state party (South Africa) is invoking the Genocide Convention's erga omnes partes standing to bring a case on behalf of a non-state population. The ruling on provisional measures — which does not determine guilt but orders precautionary steps — was globally anticipated. Internationally, the case divides broadly along geopolitical lines: the Global South and left-progressive Western opinion largely supports South Africa's action; the United States, Germany, and several other Western states have expressed scepticism or opposition. Within South Africa, the case enjoys broad cross-party support but the DA has publicly questioned the genocide framing while supporting humanitarian objectives.



## CHAPTER 3 — 15 CRITERIA: DETAILED ANALYSIS

### Hard Facts — 9 techniques that are countable and scientifically verifiable

#### 1. EXPERT SELECTION

6/10

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##### Expert 1: Unidentified SABC Analyst/Correspondent

<b>Timestamp</b>	63:23–64:21
<b>Statement</b>	***but perhaps this will help the Biden administration because as we know behind the scenes the US president has been urging the Israelis uh to uh stop uh the the the um scale of their bombardment and to tone down uh some of their military operations and to scale up the humanitarian Aid all of things that have been ignored by Israel until this point so I suspect the Biden Administration May well uh given the way this has gone um be somewhat happy with with this**
<b>Classification</b>	SABC staff analyst; affiliation, qualifications, and institutional position are not disclosed to the viewer.
<b>Missing counter-voice</b>	An analyst with expertise in Israeli security policy, international law sceptical of the genocide framing, or a representative of states opposing the case.

#### Source Depth Check:

**(a) FUNDING:** SABC — state-funded public broadcaster. Structural proximity to the South African government (the applicant state in this case) creates an institutional conflict of interest in covering a case where the government's foreign policy is directly at stake.

**(b) MANDATE:** SABC's mandate requires impartiality. Covering a case in which the South African government is a party creates a structural tension between institutional loyalty and editorial independence.

D1 Conflict of Interest: -1 — SABC is state-funded; South African government is the applicant; structural proximity to the "winning" party.

D2 Personal Risk: 0 — No personal risk evident; analyst is anonymous.

D3 Subject Competence: 0 — Qualifications not disclosed; commentary is geopolitical rather than legal; competence cannot be assessed.

D4 Opinion Consistency: 0 — No prior statements available for comparison.

D5 Emotionalisation vs. Data: -1 — Commentary is speculative ("I suspect," "May well") and geopolitical rather than data-driven; no legal analysis offered.

D6 Source Level: -1 — Secondary/tertiary; no primary sources cited in commentary.

**TOTAL: -3 → SOURCE TRAFFIC LIGHT: YELLOW**

**(c) PROFESSIONAL EXPERTISE:** The analyst is presented as an authoritative voice without disclosure of qualifications or institutional position. This implicitly frames speculative geopolitical commentary as expert analysis — a form of Technique 2 (source selection).

##### Expert 2: ICJ President Joan Donoghue (reading the Order)

<b>Timestamp</b>	14:50–62:23
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<b>Statement</b>	Verbatim reading of the ICJ Order on provisional measures.
<b>Classification</b>	President of the International Court of Justice; highest judicial authority on the matter.
<b>Missing counter-voice</b>	The dissenting opinions of Judge Sebutinde and Judge ad hoc Barak are mentioned (61:38–61:50) but not read or summarised.

#### Source Depth Check:

**(a) FUNDING:** International Court of Justice — UN principal judicial organ; funded by UN member states.

**(b) MANDATE:** Fully compatible with neutral adjudication; this is the court's own order.

D1 Conflict of Interest: +2 — Judicial institution with no party interest.

D2 Personal Risk: +1 — Judicial independence; some reputational risk in controversial cases.

D3 Subject Competence: +2 — Highest competence; this is the court's own legal determination.

D4 Opinion Consistency: +2 — Consistent with established ICJ jurisprudence on provisional measures.

D5 Emotionalisation vs. Data: +2 — Entirely data/law-based; no emotional appeals.

D6 Source Level: +2 — Primary source.

**TOTAL: +11 → SOURCE TRAFFIC LIGHT: GREEN**

**(c) PROFESSIONAL EXPERTISE:** The ICJ Order is a primary source of the highest credibility. However, the broadcast's decision to read the order without reading the dissenting opinions creates a selective presentation of the court's own record.

#### Missing Expert Groups:

- International law scholars with expertise in genocide law and sceptical of the South Africa case
- Israeli government legal team or spokesperson
- Domestic South African political analysts representing the full spectrum of opinion

#### Source Credibility Overview:

Source	D1	D2	D3	D4	D5	D6	Total	Signal
Unidentified SABC Analyst/Correspondent	-1	0	0	0	-1	-1	-3	YELLOW
ICJ President Joan Donoghue (reading the Order)	+2	+1	+2	+2	+2	+2	+11	GREEN

#### Summary (Matrix Result):

- ICJ President Donoghue: GREEN (+11) — Primary judicial source, fully credible.
- SABC Analyst: YELLOW (-3) — Unidentified, speculative, structurally conflicted.



## 2. SOURCE SELECTION

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Claims without primary source = penalty points (rumour check)

### Source 1: United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres

Timestamp	43:03–44:07
Statement	**"The Health Care system in Gaza is collapsing nowhere is safe in Gaza amid constant bombarding by the Israel Defense Forces and without shelter or the essentials to survive I expect public order to break to completely break down soon"

- (a) **Funding and governance:** UN — funded by member states including the US, EU, and others; Secretary-General is elected by the General Assembly on Security Council recommendation.
- (b) **Structural conflict of interest:** The UN Secretary-General has an institutional interest in the relevance and authority of UN institutions, including the ICJ. His statements are not neutral assessments of the legal case but humanitarian advocacy.
- (c) **Missing counter-source:** No Israeli government statement on the same humanitarian conditions is cited independently; Israel's position is only briefly referenced within the court's own summary.

### Source 2: UNRWA Commissioner-General Philippe Lazzarini

Timestamp	33:38–35:21
Statement	**"it's been 100 days since the devastating War started killing and displacing people in Gaza following the horrific attacks that Hamas and other groups carried out against people in Israel... this war affected more than 2 million people the entire population of Gaza"

- (a) **Funding:** UNRWA is funded by voluntary contributions from UN member states; its largest donors include the US, EU, Germany, and others — several of whom suspended funding in January 2024 following Israeli allegations.
- (b) **Structural conflict of interest:** UNRWA has a direct institutional interest in the continuation of its mandate and funding; its statements on Gaza conditions are advocacy as well as reporting.
- (c) **Missing counter-source:** The simultaneous UNRWA funding crisis (January 2024) — directly relevant to the humanitarian assistance measures ordered by the court — is entirely absent.

### Source 3: UN Under-Secretary-General Martin Griffiths

Timestamp	32:31–33:04
Statement	**"Gaza has become a place of death and despair families are sleeping in the open as temperatures plummet areas where civilians were told to relocate for their safety have come under bombardment medical facilities are under Relentless attack a public health disaster is unfolding Gaza has simply become uninhabitable"

- (a) **Funding:** UN OCHA — funded by UN member states and voluntary contributions.
- (b) **Structural conflict of interest:** OCHA's mandate is humanitarian advocacy; statements are inherently advocacy-oriented.
- (c) **Missing counter-source:** No independent assessment of Israeli humanitarian corridor operations or the IDF's stated civilian protection measures is cited.

Rumour Check (Penalty Points):



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No explicit rumour markers ("reportedly," "sources say," "allegedly") are present in the substantive portions of the transcript. The analyst commentary at 63:29 uses "as we know" to introduce an unverified claim about US-Israel back-channel communications: "as we know behind the scenes the US president has been urging the Israelis" — this is presented as established fact without citation.

Rumour 1:

Timestamp: 63:29–63:37

Claim: "as we know behind the scenes the US president has been urging the Israelis uh to uh stop uh the the the um scale of their bombardment"

Marker: "as we know" — presents unverified back-channel diplomatic information as common knowledge.

Primary source present: No — +1 penalty point.

*Summary: All cited sources within the ICJ Order are UN bodies or Israeli officials quoted by the court — a structurally one-sided source base that reflects the court's own evidentiary record but is not supplemented by independent or counter-sources in the broadcast's editorial framing. The analyst commentary introduces an unverified claim as established fact.*



3. AIRTIME DISTRIBUTION									3/10
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Estimated speaking time:

- ICJ President Joan Donoghue (reading the Order): approximately 47 minutes (14:50–62:23) — 74%
- SABC Analyst/Correspondent: approximately 1.5 minutes (63:23–64:21) — 2%
- Pre-broadcast/setup segments (fragmented, inaudible): approximately 14 minutes (00:28–14:50) — 22%
- French reading of operative part (Registrar): approximately 5 minutes (56:53–61:15) — included in Donoghue total above
- Israeli officials (quoted within Order): approximately 3 minutes total — included in Donoghue total
- UN officials (quoted within Order): approximately 6 minutes total — included in Donoghue total

*Summary: The airtime distribution is structurally determined by the nature of the broadcast — a live reading of a judicial order. The ICJ President dominates by necessity. However, the editorial choice to follow the order with only 90 seconds of one-sided analyst commentary, rather than a balanced panel discussion, represents a missed opportunity for balance. The 22% of inaudible pre-broadcast content cannot be assessed.*



#### 4. SELECTIVE OMISSION

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##### Omission 1: Dissenting Opinions of Judge Sebutinde and Judge ad hoc Barak

###### Context

The broadcast mentions at 61:38–61:50 that Judge Sebutinde appended a dissenting opinion and Judge ad hoc Barak appended a separate opinion, but neither is read, summarised, or discussed.

Relevant at: 61:38–61:50 — "judge seend appends a dissenting opinion to the order of the court... judge edhak Barak appends a separate opinion"

###### Effect

The viewer receives the majority order in full but has no access to the legal reasoning of the two dissenting/separate opinion judges. Judge Sebutinde's dissent (which questioned the court's jurisdiction and the plausibility finding) and Judge Barak's separate opinion (which supported the order but with important qualifications) represent significant legal perspectives that are entirely absent from the broadcast.

##### Omission 2: UNRWA Funding Crisis (January 2024)

###### Context

In the same week as the ICJ ruling, multiple major donor states (US, UK, Germany, Australia, Canada) suspended funding to UNRWA following Israeli allegations that UNRWA staff participated in the 7 October attack. This is directly relevant to the court's order requiring Israel to enable humanitarian assistance — the primary delivery mechanism for which is UNRWA.

Relevant at: 49:29–50:02 (court orders humanitarian assistance measures) — no mention of the UNRWA crisis.

###### Effect

The viewer is left with the impression that the humanitarian assistance order is straightforwardly implementable, without awareness of the simultaneous institutional crisis affecting the primary delivery mechanism.

##### Omission 3: Israel's Independent Legal Response

###### Context

Israel's legal team presented a full defence at the ICJ hearings (11–12 January 2024), arguing that the genocide framing was legally incoherent, that Israel was acting in lawful self-defence, and that the court lacked jurisdiction. This defence is referenced only in fragmentary form within the court's summary of the dispute (22:34–23:31) and is not independently presented or elaborated.

Relevant at: 22:34–23:31 — fragmentary quote from Israeli foreign affairs document.

###### Effect

The viewer receives Israel's position only as filtered through the court's summary, not as an independent legal argument.

*Summary: The three most significant omissions are the dissenting judicial opinions, the UNRWA funding crisis, and Israel's independent legal defence. Together, these omissions create a broadcast that presents the majority outcome without the legal, institutional, and political context necessary for informed public understanding.*

#### Missing Voices

- Israeli government spokesperson or legal representative: Would have provided Israel's substantive legal defence and its position on the genocide framing beyond the fragmentary quotes within the court order.



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- DA spokesperson (e.g., Darren Bergman, Shadow Minister of International Relations): Would have provided the domestic opposition perspective on the case and the genocide framing.
- International law scholar with a sceptical view of the case: Would have contextualised the legal thresholds for genocide and the evidentiary challenges South Africa faces at the merits stage.
- Hostage family representative or advocacy group: Would have provided the human dimension of the hostage crisis, which the court itself flagged as a grave concern.
- UNRWA donor state representative: Would have contextualised the simultaneous UNRWA funding crisis and its implications for humanitarian assistance.
- ICJ compliance historian/analyst: Would have contextualised the practical enforceability of provisional measures orders and the historical record of state compliance.
- Hamas or Palestinian Authority representative: Would have provided the Palestinian political perspective beyond the humanitarian framing.
- Western state representative (e.g., US, Germany, UK): Would have represented the significant bloc of states that have expressed reservations about the genocide framing.



## 5. NUMERICAL MANIPULATION

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Complete figures include: absolute value, proportion (%) and trend

### Finding 1: Palestinian Casualty Figures

**Timestamp** 31:59–32:17

Number: "25,700 Palestinians have been killed over 63,000 injuries have been reported over 360 housing units have been destroyed or partially damaged and approximately 1.7 million persons have been internally displaced"  
Dimensions: (a) Absolute value — present; (b) Proportion — partially present (1.7 million of 2.1 million population = 81% displacement, calculable but not stated); (c) Trend — absent (no comparison to earlier figures or rate of change).

**Missing context**

The court itself notes at 31:53–31:58 that *"figures relating to the Gaza Strip cannot be independently verified"* — this caveat is read but not emphasised in analyst commentary. The source of the figures (Gaza Health Ministry, which is Hamas-administered) is not identified.

**Effect**

The figures are presented as authoritative without source attribution or independent verification caveat being reinforced editorially.

### Finding 2: "93% of the population of Gaza is facing crisis levels of hunger"

**Timestamp** 33:14–33:25

Number: "an unprecedented 93% of the population of Gaza is facing crisis levels of hunger with insufficient food and high levels of malnutrition"

Dimensions: (a) Absolute value — absent (no absolute number given); (b) Proportion — present (93%); (c) Trend — absent (no baseline comparison).

**Missing context**

The IPC (Integrated Food Security Phase Classification) methodology used to generate this figure is not explained; the distinction between "crisis level" (IPC Phase 3) and "famine" (IPC Phase 5) is not drawn.

**Effect**

The figure creates an impression of near-total famine without the methodological context that would allow the viewer to assess its meaning.

*Summary: Numerical data in this broadcast is drawn from the ICJ Order itself, which cites UN sources. The primary manipulation risk is not fabrication but selective presentation — figures are cited without source attribution, verification caveats are read but not editorially reinforced, and trend data is consistently absent.*



## 6. GUILT BY ASSOCIATION

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### Association 1: Israeli Officials and "Genocidal Rhetoric"

#### Timestamp

37:53–38:17

#### Quote

*"a press release of 16 November 2023 issued by 37 special rapporteurs independent experts and members of working groups part of the special procedures of the United Nations Human Rights Council in which they voiced alarm over discernably genocidal and dehumanizing rhetoric coming from senior Israeli government officials"*

Technique: The court cites UN Special Rapporteurs characterising Israeli officials' statements as "discernably genocidal." This is read verbatim without any editorial note that (a) Special Rapporteurs are independent experts, not the UN Human Rights Council itself, (b) Israel disputes this characterisation, or (c) the court is citing this as evidence of a plausibility threshold, not a finding of genocide.

#### Effect

The association between Israeli officials and "genocidal rhetoric" is established through the authority of the court's reading, without the legal and institutional qualifications that would contextualise it.

### Association 2: Hamas and "Human Animals" — Gallant Quote

#### Timestamp

36:06–36:32

#### Quote

*"I have released all restraints you saw what we are fighting against we are fighting Human animals this is the Isis of Gaza this is what we are fighting against"*

Technique: The quote from Israeli Defence Minister Gallant is read within the court's order as evidence of dehumanising language. The association between Israeli military policy and the "human animals" characterisation is established through the court's own framing.

#### Effect

While the quote is authentic and its inclusion in the court's order is legally relevant, the broadcast does not contextualise it within the full range of Israeli official statements, nor does it note that Gallant was subsequently reprimanded for this language by other Israeli officials.

*Summary: The guilt-by-association findings in this broadcast arise primarily from the verbatim reading of the ICJ Order, which itself cites dehumanising statements by Israeli officials as evidence. The broadcast's editorial responsibility lies in the absence of contextualisation rather than active association-building. No individuals are labelled "conspiracy theorists" or similar; the association matrix is not applicable in that form.*



## 7. TIMING

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### Finding 1: Placement of Hamas Attack Context

Position: 16:55–17:19 (early in the substantive broadcast, within the court's contextual summary)

Content: "on 7 October 2023 Hamas and other armed groups carried out an attack in which more than 1,200 people were killed and more than 240 people injured. Many of those injured are children. Following this attack, Israel launched a large-scale military operation."

Timing Effect: The Hamas attack is mentioned briefly and early, then the broadcast pivots immediately to Israeli military operations and their consequences. The remainder of the broadcast (approximately 45 minutes) focuses on Palestinian casualties, Israeli official statements, and humanitarian conditions. The 7 October attack is not returned to in analyst commentary. This structural placement — early mention, then sustained focus on Israeli actions — creates a temporal framing that progressively marginalises the triggering event.

### Finding 2: Analyst Commentary Placement

Position: 63:23–64:21 (final segment, after the full order has been read)

Content: Analyst frames the ruling as potentially helpful to the Biden administration and notes international support for a ceasefire.

Timing Effect: The final editorial word — the only segment where SABC exercises independent editorial judgment — is given to a framing that presents the ruling as a diplomatic success for the pro-ceasefire camp. This placement ensures that the last impression the viewer receives is one of international validation of South Africa's position, without any counter-framing.

*Summary: The timing structure of the broadcast — brief Hamas attack context early, sustained focus on Palestinian suffering and Israeli statements throughout, and a pro-ceasefire editorial conclusion — creates a cumulative directional effect that is not balanced by any counter-narrative at any point in the broadcast.*



## 8. SELECTIVE OUTRAGE

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Outrage = bias. Selective outrage amplifies the finding. Score = outrage level (0–5) + selectivity (0–5)

*Methodological principle (v3.0): The triggering event must be documented before any assessment. A reaction can only be assessed as selective if comparable triggers at other positions produced no analogous reaction.*

### Finding 1: Emotional Language in UN Quotes — Gaza vs. Israel

#### Timestamp

32:31–33:04 (Griffiths quote on Gaza) vs. 51:44–52:07 (court statement on hostages)

Triggering event (Gaza): UN Under-Secretary-General describes Gaza as "a place of death and despair... uninhabitable... daily threats to their very existence."

Reaction: Read with full emotional weight; no editorial qualification.

Triggering event (hostages): Court states it is "Gravely concerned about the fate of the hostages... and calls for their immediate and unconditional release."

Reaction: Read in the same judicial register; no analyst commentary elaborates on the hostage situation.

Asymmetry: The Gaza humanitarian crisis receives approximately 12 minutes of quoted testimony from multiple UN officials (32:31–45:00), while the hostage situation receives a single sentence (51:44–52:07) with no elaboration. The emotional weight of the UN quotes on Gaza is not matched by equivalent humanitarian framing of the hostage crisis.

Outrage level: 2/5 — present but not intense; the broadcast is primarily judicial in register.

Selectivity: 2/5 — the imbalance is present but partially explained by the court's own proportional treatment.

*Summary: The broadcast does not exhibit intense editorial outrage, but there is a measurable asymmetry in the emotional weight and duration of coverage given to Palestinian humanitarian suffering versus Israeli hostage suffering. This asymmetry partially reflects the court's own order but is amplified by the absence of any analyst commentary on the hostage dimension.*



## 9. SELECTIVE OMISSION — OVERALL PICTURE

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### Finding 1: Absence of Dissenting Legal Perspectives

#### Timestamp

61:38–61:50 — *“judge seend appends a dissenting opinion to the order of the court”*\*

Missing perspective/fact: Judge Sebutinde's dissenting opinion argued that the court lacked jurisdiction and that the plausibility threshold for genocide had not been met. This is a significant legal counter-argument from within the court itself.

Relevance: A viewer watching this broadcast would understand that the ruling was nearly unanimous (15-2) but would have no understanding of the legal basis for the dissent.

#### Impact

The absence of the dissenting reasoning creates the impression of near-total judicial consensus on the substantive questions, when in fact the two dissenters raised fundamental jurisdictional and evidentiary objections.

### Finding 2: Absence of Israel's Self-Defence Legal Framework

#### Timestamp

22:34–23:31 — fragmentary Israel position quote.

Missing perspective/fact: Israel's legal argument that its operations constitute lawful self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter, and that the genocide convention cannot be invoked to prevent a state from defending itself against a terrorist attack, is not presented.

Relevance: This is the central legal counter-argument and is directly relevant to public understanding of the case.

#### Impact

Without this framework, the viewer cannot assess the legal contest; they receive only the applicant's framing and the court's provisional findings.

### Finding 3: Absence of Enforcement Context

No timestamp available — not addressed anywhere in the broadcast.

Missing perspective/fact: The ICJ's provisional measures orders are legally binding but have no enforcement mechanism. Historical compliance is mixed (e.g., Nicaragua v. United States, Bosnia v. Serbia). Israel has already indicated it will not comply with a ceasefire order (which was not in fact ordered, but the distinction is not made clear).

Relevance: Essential for public understanding of the practical significance of the order.

#### Impact

The viewer may believe the order has immediate practical effect, when its enforceability is legally and historically contested.

*Summary: The broadcast's completeness failures are systematic rather than incidental — the dissenting legal voices, Israel's self-defence framework, and the enforcement question are all absent, creating a picture of the ruling that is more decisive and one-sided than the legal reality warrants.*

#### Share of covered perspectives

*Inverted: original value measures coverage (higher = better). Shown as deviation (higher = larger gaps).*

[A] The legal significance and limitations of provisional measures orders (what the court did and did not decide)



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- [B] Israel's legal defence and its position that the genocide framing is legally and factually unfounded
  - [C] The Hamas attack of 7 October 2023 as the triggering event and its ongoing relevance to the legal proceedings
  - [D] Domestic South African political reactions:** including dissenting voices (DA's position)
  - [E] International reactions:** including states that opposed or abstained on related UN resolutions
  - [F] The hostage situation and its legal/humanitarian dimensions
  - [G] The practical enforceability of ICJ provisional measures orders and historical compliance record
  - [H] The distinction between the provisional measures stage and a final merits determination
  - [I] The role of UNRWA and questions about its neutrality (raised by Israel and several donor states in January 2024)
  - [J] The broader context of international humanitarian law and Israel's stated compliance measures
- ### Assessment: Was Each Perspective Addressed?

#### [A] ADDRESSED

Timestamp: 47:25–51:11 — Quote: "the decision given in the present proceedings in no way prejudices the question of the jurisdiction of the court to deal with the merits of the case" — Assessment: The court itself clearly states the limitations of the order; this is read verbatim and is therefore present, though the analyst commentary does not reinforce this distinction.

#### [B] PARTIALLY ADDRESSED

Timestamp: 22:34–23:31 — Quote: "Israel dismissed any accusation... genocide against Israel not only unfound... the accusation is not just legally incoherent it is... there was no valid basis in fact law for the outrageous..." — Assessment: Israel's position is quoted briefly within the court's summary of the dispute, but is fragmentary due to transcript degradation and receives no independent elaboration or analyst commentary.

#### [C] ADDRESSED

Timestamp: 16:55–17:19 — Quote: "on 7 october23 Hamas and other armed groups carried out an attack in is killing more than 1,200 injuring thousands 240 people many of following this attack is launched a large scale military operation" — Assessment: The Hamas attack is mentioned as contextual background within the court's order, but the transcript is degraded and the analyst does not return to this context.

#### [D] OMITTED

No timestamp available — No domestic South African political reaction beyond the implicit validation of the ANC government's position is included. The DA's publicly stated reservations are entirely absent.

#### [E] PARTIALLY ADDRESSED

Timestamp: 64:05–64:21 — Quote: "most of the International Community is now believing in the idea that there should be an... ceasefire... yes there are some European countries among those are" — Assessment: The analyst acknowledges some European dissent but the transcript cuts off; the framing ("most of the International Community") presents the pro-ceasefire position as dominant without quantification.

#### [F] ADDRESSED

Timestamp: 51:44–52:07 — Quote: "it is Gravely concerned about the fate of the hostages abducted during the attack back in Israel on 7 October 2023 and held since then by Hamas and other armed groups and calls for their immediate and unconditional release" — Assessment: The hostage issue is addressed within the court's order; it is not elaborated upon in analyst commentary.

#### [G] OMITTED

No timestamp available — The historical record of ICJ provisional measures compliance (notably the Bosnia v. Serbia case, where measures were largely ignored) is not discussed. This is a significant omission for contextualising the practical impact of the order.

#### [H] ADDRESSED

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Timestamp: 51:13–51:26 — Quote: "the court reaffirms that the decision given in the present proceedings in no way prejudices the question of the jurisdiction of the court" — Assessment: Present in the verbatim reading; not reinforced by analyst.

**[I] OMITTED**

No timestamp available — The UNRWA funding crisis (multiple donor states suspended funding to UNRWA in January 2024 following Israeli allegations of staff involvement in the 7 October attack) is entirely absent, despite UNRWA being cited as a key source within the order itself.

**[J] PARTIALLY ADDRESSED**

Timestamp: 46:21–47:00 — Quote: "the court recalls Israel's statement that it has taken certain steps to address and alleviate the conditions faced by the population in the Gaza Strip... while such steps are to be encouraged they are insufficient" — Assessment: Israel's compliance measures are mentioned within the court's order but are immediately qualified by the court's own assessment; no independent elaboration.

**Completeness Score: 4/10**

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**Reasoning:** The broadcast is primarily a verbatim reading of a legal document, which inherently limits editorial completeness. However, the analyst commentary segment (63:23–64:21) — the only portion where editorial choices are made — addresses only one perspective (the geopolitical implications for the Biden administration and the international pro-ceasefire consensus) without engaging any of the missing perspectives. The absence of Israel's independent voice, domestic South African political diversity, enforcement history, and the UNRWA controversy represents a significant gap in contextualisation.



## Soft Facts — 6 qualitative techniques

### 10. FRAMING

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#### Finding 1: The Case as South African Diplomatic Success

<b>Timestamp</b>	63:23–63:59
<b>Quote</b>	<i>“but perhaps this will help the Biden administration because as we know behind the scenes the US president has been urging the Israelis uh to uh stop uh the the the um scale of their bombardment... so I suspect the Biden Administration May well uh given the way this has gone um be somewhat happy with with this”</i>
<b>Manipulation</b>	The analyst frames the ICJ ruling primarily as a geopolitical event that validates the pro-ceasefire camp and creates diplomatic pressure on Israel. The legal complexity of the ruling — which explicitly does not order a ceasefire and does not find genocide — is not engaged.
<b>Why problematic</b>	This framing converts a nuanced judicial order into a political victory narrative, which is inconsistent with the court's own careful language about what it did and did not decide.

#### Finding 2: Gaza as Humanitarian Catastrophe — Sustained Framing

<b>Timestamp</b>	31:59–46:19 (sustained)
<b>Quote</b>	<i>“Gaza has become a place of death and despair... Gaza has simply become uninhabitable its people are witnessing daily threats to their very existence” (32:36–33:00)</i>
<b>Manipulation</b>	The broadcast devotes approximately 14 minutes to reading UN humanitarian assessments of conditions in Gaza, creating a sustained emotional frame of catastrophe. This is drawn from the court's order, but the editorial choice to broadcast it in full — without equivalent time given to Israeli security concerns or the hostage crisis — amplifies the one-sided emotional impact.
<b>Why problematic</b>	The sustained humanitarian catastrophe framing, without counter-framing, creates an emotional context in which the court's legal findings appear to be a moral verdict rather than a provisional procedural order.

#### Finding 3: "Most of the International Community"

<b>Timestamp</b>	64:07–64:15
<b>Quote</b>	<i>“most of the International Community is now believing in the idea that there should be an... ceasefire”</i>
<b>Manipulation</b>	The analyst presents the pro-ceasefire position as the dominant international consensus without quantification or acknowledgment of the significant bloc of states (US, Germany, UK, and others) that have opposed or abstained on related UN resolutions.



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**Why  
problematic**

"Most of the international community" is a framing device that marginalises dissenting state positions by characterising them as minority outliers, when in fact the geopolitical division is more complex.

*Summary: The broadcast's framing consistently presents the ICJ ruling as a moral and diplomatic victory for the pro-Palestinian camp, without engaging the legal complexity of what the court actually decided or the legitimate counter-arguments.*



11. WORD CHOICE AND TERMINOLOGY									5/10
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Finding 1: "Large Scale Military Operation" vs. "Attack"	
Timestamp	17:11–17:19
Quote	<i>**following this attack is launched a large scale military operation by Landa which is cing mass civilian casualties**</i>
Manipulation	The Hamas action is described as an "attack" while Israel's response is described as a "large scale military operation" — the court's own language. However, the broadcast does not editorially note that Israel describes its operations as a "war" or "defensive operation," while critics use terms like "bombardment" or "assault." The analyst at 63:37 uses "bombardment" — <i>**stop uh the the the um scale of their bombardment**</i> — which carries a more negative connotation than "military operation."
Why problematic	Neutral alternative would be: "military campaign" or "military operations" consistently; "bombardment" is an advocacy term when used selectively.

Finding 2: "Discernably Genocidal and Dehumanizing Rhetoric"	
Timestamp	38:07–38:17
Quote	<i>**they voiced alarm over discernably genocidal and dehumanizing rhetoric coming from senior Israeli government officials**</i>
Manipulation	The phrase "discernably genocidal" is read without editorial qualification. The court cites this as evidence of a plausibility threshold, not as a finding. The word "discernably" is a legal term of art meaning "capable of being perceived" — not "proven" or "established."
Why problematic	To a lay viewer, "discernably genocidal rhetoric" sounds like a finding of genocidal intent, when it is a threshold assessment for provisional measures purposes only.

Finding 3: "Human Animals"	
Timestamp	36:13–36:17
Quote	<i>**we are fighting Human animals this is the Isis of Gaza**</i>
Manipulation	The Gallant quote is read verbatim and in full. This is legally appropriate — it is part of the court's evidentiary record. However, the broadcast does not note that this statement was widely condemned within Israel itself, or that Gallant subsequently clarified his remarks.
Why problematic	Reading the quote without contextualisation allows it to stand as representative of Israeli official policy, when it was a single statement by one minister in the immediate aftermath of the 7 October attack.



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*Summary: The word choice findings in this broadcast arise primarily from the verbatim reading of the ICJ Order, but the analyst commentary introduces advocacy language ("bombardment") without equivalent language for the other side, and legally technical terms are read without lay explanation.*



## 12. MODERATION BEHAVIOUR

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*Methodological principle (v3.0): The triggering event must be documented before any assessment. An intervention can only be assessed as asymmetric if comparable triggers at other positions produced no analogous intervention.*

### **Finding 1:** No Interactive Moderation Present

The broadcast consists of a live reading of a judicial order followed by brief analyst commentary. There is no interview, no panel discussion, and no moderation in the conventional sense. The pre-broadcast segment (00:28–14:50) is too degraded to assess.

*Summary: Moderation behaviour cannot be meaningfully assessed in this broadcast format. The score of 2 reflects the absence of any corrective editorial intervention when the analyst commentary introduces speculative and one-sided framing at 63:23–64:21 — a passive editorial failure rather than active asymmetric moderation.*



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### 13. QUESTION ASYMMETRY

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#### **Finding 1:** No Interview Format Present

No questions are posed to any guest or interviewee in the audible portions of this broadcast. The pre-broadcast segment is too degraded to assess.

*Summary: Question asymmetry cannot be assessed in this broadcast format. Score of 1 reflects the structural absence of the format rather than a finding of balance.*



## 14. FALSE BALANCE

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### Finding 1: Operative Measures Vote Counts — Presented Without Context

**Timestamp** 52:17–56:41 (vote counts for each operative measure)

Construct: The broadcast reads the vote counts for each provisional measure (15-2, 15-2, 16-1, 16-1, 15-2, 15-2) without explaining what the two dissenting votes represent legally or substantively.

#### Analysis

The vote counts create the impression of near-total consensus. However, the two dissenting judges (Sebutinde and Barak) represent significant legal positions — Sebutinde dissented on jurisdiction and plausibility; Barak (Israel's ad hoc judge) dissented on specific measures. Presenting the numbers without the substance of the dissent creates a false impression of the degree of legal consensus.

### Finding 2: "Some European Countries" — False Minority Framing

**Timestamp** 64:15–64:21

Construct: "yes there are some European countries among those are" — transcript cuts off.

#### Analysis

The analyst's framing of European states that do not support a ceasefire as "some" countries implies they are a small minority, when in fact the US, Germany, UK, and several other major European states have expressed reservations. This creates a false balance by understating the size and significance of the dissenting international bloc.

*Summary: The false balance findings in this broadcast operate in the direction of overstating consensus — presenting the majority position as more dominant than it is, and the dissenting position as more marginal than it is.*



## 15. AGENDA-SETTING

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### Finding 1: The ICJ Ruling as a Moral Verdict

Agenda element set as given: That the ICJ's provisional measures order constitutes a moral and legal validation of South Africa's genocide framing.

#### Timestamp

63:23–64:21 — *“but perhaps this will help the Biden administration... most of the International Community is now believing in the idea that there should be an... ceasefire”*

Alternative agenda: The court explicitly stated that the order does not prejudge the merits, does not find genocide, and does not order a ceasefire. An alternative agenda would treat the ruling as a procedural step in a long legal process with an uncertain outcome.

### Finding 2: Israel as the Responsible Party

Agenda element set as given: That Israel bears primary responsibility for the humanitarian crisis in Gaza.

#### Timestamp

31:59–46:19 (sustained) — the entire humanitarian evidence section focuses on conditions caused by Israeli military operations, with Hamas's role limited to the brief 7 October contextual mention.

Alternative agenda: A balanced agenda would treat the humanitarian crisis as having multiple contributing factors, including Hamas's use of civilian infrastructure, the hostage situation, and the role of international actors in enabling or preventing humanitarian access.

### Finding 3: International Consensus as Pro-Ceasefire

Agenda element set as given: That the international community broadly supports a ceasefire and that dissenting states are outliers.

#### Timestamp

64:07–64:15 — *“most of the International Community is now believing in the idea that there should be an... ceasefire”*

Alternative agenda: A balanced agenda would present the international community as genuinely divided, with major Western states holding positions that complicate the "consensus" framing.

*Summary: The broadcast's agenda-setting function operates primarily through the analyst commentary segment, which treats the ruling as a moral victory, Israel as the responsible party, and the pro-ceasefire position as the international consensus — all of which are contested framings that are presented as self-evident.*



## CHAPTER 4 — OVERALL EVALUATION

### Results

- HARD FACTS SCORE (Average Criteria 1–9): 4.8 / 10
- SOFT FACTS SCORE (Average Criteria 10–15): 4.2 / 10

### Dominant Techniques

The 3 strongest techniques in this broadcast:

- 1. Selective Omission (Score 7):** The systematic absence of dissenting judicial opinions, Israel's independent legal defence, and the UNRWA funding crisis creates a picture of the ruling that is more decisive and one-sided than the legal reality warrants. These are not incidental omissions but structurally consistent gaps that all point in the same direction.
- 2. Completeness Failure (Score 7):** The broadcast fails to provide the contextual information necessary for informed public understanding — enforcement history, the distinction between provisional measures and a merits finding, and the full range of domestic and international political reactions. This failure is amplified by the brevity and one-sidedness of the analyst commentary.
- 3. Framing (Score 6):** The analyst commentary converts a nuanced judicial order into a political victory narrative, treating the ruling as a moral verdict and the pro-ceasefire position as the international consensus. This framing is inconsistent with the court's own careful language and with the actual state of international opinion.

### Core Messages of the Broadcast

**\*\*MESSAGE 1 (SUBSTANTIVE):** \*\* "The ICJ has effectively validated South Africa's genocide case against Israel."

**Technique:** Framing through selective reading (full majority order, no dissenting opinions) and analyst commentary that treats the ruling as a diplomatic success. — Evidence: 47:25–51:11, 63:23–64:00.

**\*\*MESSAGE 2 (PERSONAL):** \*\* "Israel's leaders have used dehumanising language that the international community has condemned."

**Technique:** Guilt by association through verbatim reading of Gallant, Herzog, and Katz quotes without contextualisation or counter-statements. — Evidence: 36:06–38:17.

**\*\*MESSAGE 3 (SOCIETAL):** \*\* "The international community broadly supports a ceasefire and South Africa's legal action represents the global moral consensus."

**Technique:** Agenda-setting through analyst commentary framing and selective presentation of international reactions. — Evidence: 64:07–64:21.

### Manipulation Level Classification

**Reasoning:** The overall score of 4.5 places this broadcast at the upper boundary of "slight tendency," approaching "clear one-sidedness." The primary driver is not active distortion but systematic omission — the broadcast does not fabricate or misrepresent, but it consistently fails to include perspectives, sources, and context that would complicate the dominant framing. The analyst commentary segment, though brief, is editorially significant because it is the only portion of the broadcast where SABC exercises independent editorial judgment, and it does so in a one-sided manner. Under Broadcasting Act s. 6 and BCCSA Code Clause 18, the absence of opposing views on a matter of significant public controversy — particularly the dissenting judicial opinions and Israel's legal defence — constitutes a measurable departure from the impartiality standard, even if it does not reach the threshold of systematic bias.

### CONCLUSION

This SABC broadcast of the ICJ provisional measures order in South Africa v. Israel is primarily a live judicial reading — a format that inherently limits editorial manipulation. The verbatim reading of the court's order is itself a primary source of high credibility. However, the broadcast's editorial failures are concentrated in two areas: first, the systematic omission of dissenting perspectives (judicial dissents, Israel's independent legal defence, the UNRWA funding crisis, enforcement history); and second, the brief but one-sided analyst commentary segment that frames the ruling as a diplomatic and moral victory without engaging its legal complexity or limitations. Under Broadcasting Act 4



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of 1999, Section 6, and BCCSA Code Clause 18, SABC is required to present opposing views on controversial issues of public importance — the Gaza conflict and the genocide framing are among the most contested issues in contemporary international affairs, and the broadcast does not meet this standard. The overall score of 4.5/10 reflects a broadcast that is not systematically manipulative but falls measurably short of the impartiality and completeness standards required of a public broadcaster, particularly in the editorial choices made around the analyst commentary and the decision not to read or summarise the dissenting opinions.



## OVERALL EVALUATION OF THE 15 CRITERIA

### Individual Scores — All 15 Criteria

No.	Criterion	Score	Rating
1	EXPERT SELECTION	6/10	Significant imbalance
2	SOURCE SELECTION	6/10	Significant imbalance
3	AIRTIME DISTRIBUTION	3/10	Slight imbalance
4	SELECTIVE OMISSION	7/10	Pronounced imbalance
5	NUMERICAL MANIPULATION	4/10	Slight imbalance
6	GUILT BY ASSOCIATION	3/10	Slight imbalance
7	TIMING	4/10	Slight imbalance
8	SELECTIVE OUTRAGE	3/10	Slight imbalance
9	SELECTIVE OMISSION — OVERALL PICTURE	7/10	Pronounced imbalance
10	FRAMING	6/10	Significant imbalance
11	WORD CHOICE AND TERMINOLOGY	5/10	Significant imbalance
12	MODERATION BEHAVIOUR	2/10	Unremarkable
13	QUESTION ASYMMETRY	1/10	Unremarkable
14	FALSE BALANCE	5/10	Significant imbalance
15	AGENDA-SETTING	6/10	Significant imbalance

#### HARD FACTS SCORE (1-8)

**4.8/10**

Significant imbalance

#### SOFT FACTS SCORE (9-14)

**4.2/10**

Significant imbalance

#### OVERALL SCORE

**4.5/10**

Significant imbalance

*Average of Hardfacts and Softfacts*



## KEY — Score Definitions

### Individual Scores per Criterion (0–10)

<b>0</b>	<b>No finding</b>	No relevant anomaly detected.
<b>1–2</b>	<b>Weak finding</b>	Minor anomaly without substantial impact on balance.
<b>3–4</b>	<b>Slight to moderate finding</b>	Recognizable tendency; low to moderate impact relevance.
<b>5</b>	<b>Moderate finding with impact</b>	Relevant imbalance affecting the audience's opinion-forming potential.
<b>6</b>	<b>Significant finding (threshold)</b>	Scores of 6 and above are classified as 'significant findings.'
<b>7</b>	<b>Significant finding</b>	Clear, well-documented imbalance with distinct impact relevance.
<b>8–9</b>	<b>Severe finding</b>	Pronounced imbalance; multiple documented individual findings in this criterion.
<b>10</b>	<b>Maximum severity</b>	Systematic, pervasive imbalance in this criterion.

### Aggregated Deviation Index — Interpretation Ranges

<b>0.0 – 2.5</b>	<b>Unremarkable</b>	No significant patterns detected; broadcast meets the impartiality standard.
<b>2.6 – 4.0</b>	<b>Slight imbalance</b>	Isolated anomalies; statistically visible but within tolerance range.
<b>4.1 – 6.0</b>	<b>Significant imbalance</b>	Multiple significant findings; relevant impairment of perspective diversity.
<b>6.1 – 8.0</b>	<b>Serious deviation from the impartiality standard. High degree of deviation</b>	Pronounced, cross-broadcast patterns; high impact relevance.
<b>8.1 – 10</b>	<b>Fundamental systemic one-sidedness. Very high bias degree</b>	Maximum severity across nearly all criteria; systematically one-sided reporting.

### Party-Political Bias (-5 to +5)

<b>-5 to -3</b>	<b>Strongly disadvantaged</b>	Party is significantly underrepresented in framing, airtime, or presentation.
<b>-2 to -1</b>	<b>Slightly disadvantaged</b>	Recognizable but minor disadvantage.
<b>0</b>	<b>Neutral</b>	No detectable favoritism or disadvantage.
<b>+1 to +2</b>	<b>Slightly favored</b>	Recognizable but minor favoritism.
<b>+3 to +5</b>	<b>Strongly favored</b>	Party is significantly overrepresented in framing, airtime, or presentation.



## CHAPTER 5 — LEGAL CLASSIFICATION (Broadcasting Act s. 6)

### Assessment under Broadcasting Act s. 6

Broadcasting Act 4 of 1999, Section 6 (SABC Charter) requires significant news and public affairs programming that meets the highest standards of journalism, including fairness, accuracy, and impartiality. BCCSA Code Clause 16 requires news to be reported truthfully, accurately and fairly, in the correct context and in a balanced manner. Clause 18 requires opposing views to be presented on controversial issues of public importance.

#### Violation 1:

Standard: BCCSA Code Clause 18 — Opposing views on controversial issues of public importance.

Conduct: The broadcast presents the ICJ majority order in full (approximately 47 minutes) but does not read, summarise, or discuss the dissenting opinions of Judge Sebutinde and Judge ad hoc Barak, which represent significant legal counter-arguments on jurisdiction and plausibility.

Evidence: Timestamp 61:38–61:50 — "judge seend appends a dissenting opinion to the order of the court... judge edhak Barack appends a separate opinion" — mentioned but not elaborated.

Assessment: On a matter of significant public controversy — whether Israel's actions in Gaza constitute genocide — the court itself was divided. The broadcast's failure to present the legal reasoning of the dissenting judges deprives the public of the opposing legal view within the court's own record, in violation of Clause 18's requirement to present opposing views on controversial issues.

#### Violation 2:

Standard: Broadcasting Act s. 6 — Highest standards of journalism, including impartiality; BCCSA Code Clause 16 — correct context and balanced manner.

Conduct: The analyst commentary at 63:23–64:21 presents a one-sided geopolitical framing of the ruling (as helpful to the Biden administration, as reflecting international consensus for a ceasefire) without any counter-framing, without disclosure of the analyst's qualifications, and with an unverified claim presented as established fact ("as we know behind the scenes").

Evidence: Timestamp 63:23–64:21 — "but perhaps this will help the Biden administration... I suspect the Biden Administration May well... be somewhat happy with this... most of the International Community is now believing in the idea that there should be an... ceasefire"

Assessment: The analyst commentary, as the only segment of the broadcast where SABC exercises independent editorial judgment, fails the impartiality standard. It presents speculative geopolitical analysis as authoritative commentary, introduces an unverified claim as fact, and frames the ruling as a victory for one side in a contested international dispute, without any balancing perspective.

#### Violation 3:

Standard: BCCSA Code Clause 16 — correct context.

Conduct: The broadcast does not contextualise the ICJ's provisional measures order within the enforcement framework — specifically, that provisional measures orders are legally binding but have no enforcement mechanism, and that the historical compliance record is mixed.

Evidence: No timestamp available — the enforcement question is not addressed anywhere in the broadcast.

Assessment: Presenting a judicial order as having practical effect without explaining the enforcement limitations fails the "correct context" requirement of Clause 16. A viewer watching this broadcast would reasonably but incorrectly conclude that the order will have immediate practical consequences for Israeli military operations.

### Overall Assessment under Broadcasting Act s. 6

This broadcast falls measurably short of the impartiality and completeness standards required under Broadcasting Act 4 of 1999, Section 6, and the BCCSA Code. The violations identified are not of the most serious kind — there is no



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fabrication, no active misrepresentation, and the core of the broadcast (the verbatim reading of the ICJ Order) is a primary source of high integrity. However, the systematic omission of dissenting judicial opinions, the absence of Israel's independent legal defence, the failure to contextualise the enforcement limitations of the order, and the one-sided analyst commentary collectively constitute a departure from the fairness, accuracy, and impartiality standards that the Broadcasting Act requires of the SABC as a public broadcaster. The structural conflict of interest — SABC covering a case in which the South African government is the applicant — makes the impartiality obligation more demanding, not less, and the broadcast does not meet that heightened standard. These findings would support a complaint to the BCCSA under Clauses 16 and 18, though the overall severity (overall score 4.5/10) does not suggest a case of systematic or deliberate bias.



## CHAPTER 6 — Source Depth Check

### 1. United Nations Secretary-General (António Guterres)

- FUNDING:** UN — funded by member state contributions; largest contributors include US, China, Japan, Germany, UK.
- MANDATE:** The Secretary-General's mandate includes humanitarian advocacy and peace promotion; not a neutral legal assessor of the genocide question.
- CONFLICT OF INTEREST:** Institutional interest in the relevance and authority of UN institutions, including the ICJ; statements on Gaza are humanitarian advocacy, not neutral legal analysis.
- CREDIBILITY MATRIX:**
  - D1 Conflict of Interest: 0 — Institutional interest in UN relevance, but no direct party interest.
  - D2 Personal Risk: +1 — Statements on Gaza have attracted criticism from Israel and some Western states.
  - D3 Subject Competence: +1 — Competent on humanitarian conditions; not a genocide law expert.
  - D4 Opinion Consistency: +1 — Consistent humanitarian advocacy position.
  - D5 Emotionalisation vs. Data: -1 — Statements are emotionally framed ("nowhere is safe," "catastrophe").
  - D6 Source Level: +1 — Secondary (reporting on conditions, not primary witness).**TOTAL: +3 → SOURCE TRAFFIC LIGHT: YELLOW**
- COUNTER-VOICE:** Israeli government statements on humanitarian corridor operations and civilian protection measures are not cited independently.

### 2. UNRWA Commissioner-General (Philippe Lazzarini)

- FUNDING:** UNRWA — funded by voluntary contributions from UN member states; funding suspended by multiple major donors in January 2024 (the same week as this broadcast) following Israeli allegations of staff involvement in the 7 October attack.
- MANDATE:** UNRWA's mandate is to provide relief and works services to Palestinian refugees; it has a direct institutional interest in the continuation of its mandate and funding.
- CONFLICT OF INTEREST:** UNRWA has a strong institutional interest in maximising the perceived severity of the humanitarian crisis in Gaza, as this directly supports its funding and mandate arguments. The simultaneous funding crisis (not mentioned in the broadcast) creates an additional conflict of interest.
- CREDIBILITY MATRIX:**
  - D1 Conflict of Interest: -2 — Direct institutional interest in the narrative of humanitarian catastrophe.
  - D2 Personal Risk: +1 — Lazzarini has faced personal criticism and institutional pressure.
  - D3 Subject Competence: +2 — Direct operational presence in Gaza; competent on humanitarian conditions.
  - D4 Opinion Consistency: +1 — Consistent advocacy position.
  - D5 Emotionalisation vs. Data: -1 — Statements are emotionally framed ("heartbreaking," "traumatized").
  - D6 Source Level: +1 — Secondary (reporting on conditions observed by UNRWA staff).**TOTAL: +2 → SOURCE TRAFFIC LIGHT: YELLOW**
- COUNTER-VOICE:** The UNRWA funding crisis (January 2024) and Israeli allegations about UNRWA staff are entirely absent from the broadcast, despite being directly relevant to the court's humanitarian assistance order.

### 3. UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs (Martin Griffiths / OCHA)

- FUNDING:** UN OCHA — funded by UN member states and voluntary contributions.
- MANDATE:** Humanitarian coordination and advocacy; not a neutral legal assessor.
- CONFLICT OF INTEREST:** OCHA's mandate is humanitarian advocacy; institutional interest in maximising perceived severity of humanitarian crises to mobilise donor response.
- CREDIBILITY MATRIX:**
  - D1 Conflict of Interest: -1 — Institutional advocacy mandate.
  - D2 Personal Risk: 0 — No significant personal risk evident.
  - D3 Subject Competence: +2 — Direct operational competence on humanitarian conditions.
  - D4 Opinion Consistency: +1 — Consistent humanitarian advocacy.
  - D5 Emotionalisation vs. Data: -1 — Statements are emotionally framed ("place of death and despair").



D6 Source Level: +1 — Secondary.

**TOTAL: +2 → SOURCE TRAFFIC LIGHT: YELLOW**

**5. COUNTER-VOICE:** No independent assessment of Israeli humanitarian corridor operations or IDF civilian protection measures is cited.

#### 4. UN Special Rapporteurs (37 experts, press release of 16 November 2023)

**1. FUNDING:** UN Human Rights Council special procedures — funded by the UN; Special Rapporteurs serve in their personal capacity and are unpaid.

**2. MANDATE:** Independent expert monitoring of human rights; mandate is compatible with neutral assessment in principle, but Special Rapporteurs are appointed through a political process and their statements are advocacy-oriented.

**3. CONFLICT OF INTEREST:** Special Rapporteurs have an institutional interest in the relevance of the human rights monitoring system; several of the 37 signatories have publicly stated positions on the Israel-Palestine conflict.

**4. CREDIBILITY MATRIX:**

D1 Conflict of Interest: -1 — Advocacy mandate; some signatories have prior stated positions.

D2 Personal Risk: +1 — Some have faced criticism and pressure for their statements.

D3 Subject Competence: +1 — Varied; some are genocide law experts, others are not.

D4 Opinion Consistency: 0 — Mixed; some have been consistent, others have not.

D5 Emotionalisation vs. Data: -1 — "Discernably genocidal" is a legal term used in an advocacy context.

D6 Source Level: 0 — Secondary (assessment of statements, not primary witness).

**TOTAL: 0 → SOURCE TRAFFIC LIGHT: YELLOW**

**5. COUNTER-VOICE:** The broadcast does not note that Israel and several Western states disputed the characterisation of Israeli officials' statements as "discernably genocidal."

> **IMPORTANT NOTE:** "Recognised" or "authoritative" is not a substantive qualification. It is a social attribution that must itself be examined. All four UN sources cited in this broadcast are YELLOW — credible within their domains but structurally oriented toward humanitarian advocacy, not neutral legal analysis. Their citation without qualification as authoritative sources is itself a source selection finding.

*Analysis completed under Version 3.0-detail methodology. All findings are based strictly on the audible and transcribed portions of the broadcast. Inaudible segments (approximately 00:28–14:50 and portions of 21:00–24:00) are noted as unassessable and no inferences are drawn from them. This analysis is prepared for compliance assessment purposes under Broadcasting Act 4 of 1999, Section 6, and the BCCSA Code.*

#### Source Credibility Overview:

Source	D1	D2	D3	D4	D5	D6	Total	Signal
United Nations Secretary-General (António Guterres)	0	+1	+1	+1	-1	+1	+3	YELLOW
UNRWA Commissioner-General (Philippe Lazzarini)	-2	+1	+2	+1	-1	+1	+2	YELLOW
UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs (Martin Griffiths / OCHA)	-1	0	+2	+1	-1	+1	+2	YELLOW
UN Special Rapporteurs (37 experts, press release of 16 November 2023)	-1	+1	+1	0	-1	0	0	YELLOW

#### Legal and Methodological Notes



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**No factual determination**

The results presented do not constitute factual determinations about individual persons, editorial teams, or broadcasts. They are the product of a standardized operationalization, not a finding of individual responsibility.

**No legal judgment**

The aggregated deviation index does not replace a legal assessment under Broadcasting Act s. 6. The determination of whether a specific broadcast violates legal requirements is exclusively the responsibility of the competent authorities (in particular BCCSA).

**No proof of causation**


Statistical correlations are not to be interpreted as proof of causal relationships or editorial intent. Deviation values may be influenced by topic selection, news environment, political controversy, or format logic.

**No judgment of intent**

The analysis measures observable structural characteristics of broadcasts. A score of 7 means a significant imbalance was detected — not that the editorial team intended it. The methodology makes no claims about motives or strategic objectives.

**Heuristic comparison tool**

The index serves comparative pattern recognition across thousands of broadcasts, not precise metric measurement of individual segments. Threshold values serve heuristic orientation, not sharp legal qualification.



## APPENDIX 1: NATIONAL BROADCASTING LAW

### South Africa — Legal Framework for Broadcasting Impartiality

#### Primary Legislation

##### Broadcasting Act 4 of 1999 (as amended)

The Broadcasting Act establishes the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) as a public broadcaster and defines its Charter obligations.

Section 6 — Charter of the Corporation:

The SABC Charter mandates that the public broadcaster must:

- Provide programming that reflects South African attitudes, opinions, ideas, values and artistic creativity
- Offer a plurality of views and a variety of news, information and analysis
- Provide significant news and public affairs programming that meets the highest standards of journalism, including fairness, accuracy, and impartiality

Section 10 — Editorial Independence:

The SABC's news and current affairs programming must be independent from government or political party influence. The Board must ensure editorial policies that safeguard journalistic integrity.

##### ICASA Act 13 of 2000

The Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA) is the regulatory body responsible for broadcasting licensing and compliance.

##### Electronic Communications Act 36 of 2005

Provides the overarching regulatory framework for electronic communications, including broadcasting standards.

##### BCCSA Broadcasting Code of Conduct

The Broadcasting Complaints Commission of South Africa (BCCSA) enforces the Free-to-Air Broadcasting Code of Conduct, which includes:

Clause 16 — News:

- News must be reported truthfully, accurately and fairly
- News must be presented in the correct context and in a balanced manner
- Only verified facts may be presented as facts; opinions must be clearly identified as such

Clause 17 — Comment:

- Comment must be clearly distinguished from fact
- Comment must be an honest expression of opinion and must be presented fairly

Clause 18 — Controversial Issues of Public Importance:

- When a programme deals with a controversial issue of public importance, opposing views must be presented, either within the same programme or in a follow-up programme within a reasonable time
- This requirement applies to all broadcasting services


Clause 20 — Elections:

- During election periods, broadcasters must ensure equitable treatment of all political parties
- ICASA issues specific election broadcasting regulations

#### Regulatory / Complaints Bodies

Body	Role	Binding?
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**President:** Schläpfer, David - **Contact:** [kontakt@SVFAB.ch](mailto:kontakt@SVFAB.ch) - **Address:** SVFAB, Postfach, CH-8021 Zurich 1



ICASA (Independent Communications Authority of South Africa)	Licensing, spectrum, compliance enforcement	Yes — can fine, revoke licences
BCCSA (Broadcasting Complaints Commission of South Africa)	Content complaints (bias, fairness, accuracy)	Yes — can reprimand, fine, require corrections
SABC Board	Internal editorial oversight	Internal
Parliament Portfolio Committee on Communications	Political oversight of SABC	Indirect

### Notable Enforcement

- May 2024: ICASA fined SABC R500,000 for refusing to broadcast the Democratic Alliance's election advertisement showing a burning South African flag, ruling that SABC violated the right to free political communication.
- 2016: Western Cape High Court ordered removal of COO Hlaudi Motsoeneng for systematic censorship and political interference at SABC.
- 2017: Labour Court ruled that dismissal of the "SABC 8" journalists (who protested censorship of protest footage) was unlawful.

### Equivalent to Other Countries

Country	Law	South African Equivalent
CH	Art. 4 RTVG	Broadcasting Act s. 6 (SABC Charter)
SE	Radio- och TV-lagen 5 kap.	BCCSA Code Cl. 16-18
DE	MStV §26	ICASA Act + BCCSA Code
NO	NRK-vedtektene §6	Broadcasting Act s. 10 (Editorial Independence)



## APPENDIX 2: SCIENTIFIC REFERENCES

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### SVFAB Working Papers

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- Schläpfer, D. (2026). Systematic AI-Assisted Analysis of Public Broadcaster Impartiality: A Scalable Methodological Framework for Measuring Structural Bias in Public Service Media. [SSRN 6688478](#)
- Schläpfer, D. (2026). Measuring Editorial Noise: A Retrospective Suppression Index for Public Broadcasting Content Analysis. [SSRN 6733280](#)
- Schläpfer, D. (2026). Source Traffic Light: A Six-Dimensional Credibility Framework for Systematic Source Assessment in Public Service Media. [SSRN 6733880](#)

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At SVFAB.ch you will find detailed reports and can also commission custom analyses for any broadcast (billed separately). To ensure the quality of our work, we depend on membership fees and donations.


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**Unbalanced Reporting** is the response to the halving initiative in Switzerland: Manipulation techniques are explained in detail, starting with the selection of staff and sources. Then 15 principles are explained: omission, framing, temporal framing, guilt by association, emotionalisation, context removal and many more, illustrated with numerous examples. Additionally, it becomes apparent where we ourselves apply these techniques – fostering not only awareness but also empathy.

Optionally the book comes with **playing cards**.

Also available as an **audiobook**.



The interview is not a conversation. It is a stage – and someone else has written the script.

Those who don't know this deliver material. Good quotes that get cut wrong. Correct statements that end up in the wrong context. Honest answers framed as confessions.

This book is not a media criticism book. It is a toolbox – for everyone who faces a microphone and wants to know what to do about it. 7 chapters. 7 tools: What an interview really is. The 7 most common traps. The three principles of sovereignty – anchoring, reframing, setting boundaries. Preparation in one hour. Body and voice. What to do when things go wrong. And what matters after the interview.


For politicians, activists, entrepreneurs, whistleblowers – for everyone who is in the public eye and wants to understand how the game works. So they stop playing along – and start shaping it.

In A5 format. Direct. For preparation, reference, follow-up and when difficulties arise



**You think you see the world.** In Wirklichkeit siehst du den Rahmen, den jemand um sie gelegt hat. Framing ist die älteste und eleganteste Manipulationstechnik der world. Sie verändert nicht die Fakten – sie verändert, was wir aus den Fakten machen. Wie wir fühlen. Was wir glauben. Wie wir entscheiden. Und sie funktioniert – weil wir alle mitmachen. Täglich. Unbewusst. Auch du. Dieses Buch ist kein trockenes Lehrbuch. Es ist ein Übungsbuch – spielerisch, direkt, voller Beispiele aus dem echten Leben. Du lernst nicht nur, wie andere dich framen. Du lernst, wie du selbst framest – und wie du es bewusst und fair einsetzen kannst.

Because whoever understands framing sees the world more clearly. Hears news differently. Conducts conversations more confidently. And no longer so easily accepts a frame chosen by someone else.



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With many exercises and concrete examples from politics, media and everyday life – and the occasional smile.

**Framing with style. Because the frame changes everything.**



The SRG collects 1.56 billion francs per year – compulsorily, from every household. Those who feel unfairly treated can file a complaint. There is even an authority for this: the UBI, the Independent Complaints Authority for Radio and Television.

But: It is not independent. It has no sanctioning power. And it decides in 99.6% of all cases: nothing.

This analysis exposes the system – factual, precise, without polemics. Procedures, personnel, powers, costs, statistics, legal recourse. And the constitutional review showing: the UBI system meets none of the three fundamental criteria – it is not proportionate, not separated by powers, not market-based.

The authority supposed to protect citizens primarily protects the system it should be overseeing.

Essential reading for anyone considering a complaint – and for anyone who wants to understand why genuine media oversight in Switzerland is still pending.